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At the initial stage of Internet development during the 1990s, 
cyberspace was hailed as a borderless, decentralized and open world of 
free-flowing information. The term Internet sovereignty was 
developed by early eminent engineers, scholars and Internet 
exceptionalists inspired by the New Left Movement of the 1960s and 
the New Social Movement of the 1970s and 1980s.1 In the eyes of 
these Internet pioneers, cyberspace should be operated without 
systematic control from any authoritative entity or regulatory 
arbitrage. 2  The core nature of the Internet is to advance the 
dissemination of knowledge and to achieve personal freedom through 
a self-governance mechanism. Accordingly, cyber sovereignty was 
democratically interpreted as a utopian concept exempted from 
governmental control and free of cooperation constraints; it is 
essentially about granting users’ rights and empowering users with 
shared resources to govern themselves. 
 
However, with the U.S. government’s reign over root servers in the 
late 90s, the noble fantasy of cyber-utopianists was officially 
bankrupted. Entering into the 21st century, commercialization has 
made the Internet an artificial, man-made network that operates within 
geographical borders.3 Nowadays, the subject of Internet sovereignty 
has shifted from governing users to governing states. Cyber 
sovereignty has become synonymous with states endeavoring to 
impose control over the intangible cyberspace within territorial 





1 Liu Han (刘晗), Yuming Xitong, Wangluo Zhuquan Yu Hulianwang Zhili: Lishi 
Fansi Jiqi Dangdai Qishi (域名系统、网络主权与互联网治理：历史反思及其当
代启示) [DNS, Cyber Sovereignty and Internet Governance: A Historical Reflection 
and its Contemporary Legacy], 28 Peking Uni. L. J. (中外法学) 518, (2016).  
2 See, e.g., David Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1370 (1996); Timothy S. Wu, Cyberspace 
Sovereignty? 10 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 467 (1997).  
3 JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD 58-59 (2006).  
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the Internet with regulatory law and policies. The motivations for these 
practices range widely; from concerns over national security, 
copyright protection, and protection of social values, to the protection 
of economic monopolies. For China, although Internet sovereignty is a 
relatively new concept, it follows the entrenched core rationale of its 
assertive Internet stance, that is, to exert extensive control in order to 
maintain its social stability and regime legitimacy.  
 
The Chinese idea of cyber sovereignty is a high-profile declaration of 
intent to fragment the Internet with its jurisdiction.4 It was firstly 
introduced in a Chinese manifesto on the Internet, “The Internet in 
China,” published by the Chinese State Council Information Office in 
2010.5 This white paper characterizes the “Internet sovereignty of 
China” as “within Chinese territory the Internet is under the 
jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty” and proclaims that “the Internet 
sovereignty of China should be respected and protected.”6 Its emphasis 
on noninterference and equal participation can be understood in 
conformity with China’s regulatory tone of foreign policy; according 
to President Xi, cyber sovereignty conveys “respecting each country’s 
right to choose its own Internet development path, its own Internet 
management model [and] its own public policies on the Internet.”7 
 
This concept has been increasingly prevalent in Chinese official 
discourse since 2014. In 2014, President Xi Jinping called for other 
countries to “respect sovereignty on the Internet” at the First World 
Internet Conference. In the following year, he proposed the “four 
principles” and “five-point advocacy,” with the first principle 





4 INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF CHINA, INTERNET IN CHINA 2 (2010).  
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 11.  
7 Bruce Sterling, Respecting Chinese and Russian Cyber-Sovereignty In The 
Formerly Global Internet, WIRED (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.wired.com/beyond-
the-beyond/2015/12/respecting-chinese-and-russian-cyber-sovereignty-in-the-
formerly-global-internet/ [https://perma.cc/TE46-ZSDH]. 
8 Catherine Shu, China Tried to Get World Internet Conference Attendees To Ratify 
This Ridiculous Draft Declaration, TECH CRUNCH (Nov. 14, 2014, 12:52 PM), 
https://techcrunch.com/2014/11/20/worldinternetconference-declaration 
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Wuzhen World Internet Conference in November 2016, Xi called for 
“more fair and equitable” governance of the global web and stated that 
China would work to uphold “cyber sovereignty.”9 In 2017, cyber 
sovereignty became the “key in China’s vision of internet 
development” in Xi’s speech at the 19th Party Congress.10 
 
This concept has attracted both domestic and international attention 
and elicited controversial debates. Advocates, mostly Chinese 
scholars, warmly embrace the idea of cyber sovereignty. They believe 
that this idea contributes to the protection of national security,11 as well 
as ideology security.12 Western observers tend to reduce China’s cyber 
 
[https://perma.cc/44N5-UUSV] (“We should respect each country’s rights to the 
development, use and governance of the Internet, refrain from abusing resources and 
technological strengths to violate other countries’ Internet sovereignty, and build an 
Internet order to equality and mutual benefit.” “Third, jointly safeguard cyber 
security. We should actively cope with challenges to cyberspace security and reject 
all forms of cyber-attacks and Internet theft. We should work together to fight cyber-
crimes, protect individual privacy and information security, and safeguard the 
legitimate rights and interests of citizens.”).  
9 Cao Yin & Zhang Zhihao, Xi: Share Internet Governance, CHINA DAILY ASIA 
(Nov. 16, 2016, 5:30 PM), https://www.chinadailyasia.com/nation/2016-
11/16/content_15527097.html [https://perma.cc/ZF6E-K42N]. 
10 Mark Schiefelbein, Chinese President Xi Jinping delivers a speech at China’s 19th 
Party Congress, ABC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2017, 4:23 AM), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-12-03/chinese-
president%C2%A0xi%C2%A0jinping%C2%A0delivers-a-speech/9221698. 
11 See, e.g., Liu Yangyue (刘杨钺) & Yang Yixin (杨一心), Wangluo Kongjian 
“Zaizhuquanhua” Yu Guoji Wangluo Zhili de Weilai ("网络空间“再主权化” 与国
际网络治理的未来) [The Re-territorialization of Cyberspace And The Future of 
International Internet Governance], 15 INT’L F. (国际论坛) 1, 4 (2013); Wu Hequan 
(邬贺铨) & Ni Guangnan (倪光南), Meiyou Wangluo Anquan Jiu Meiyou Guojia 
Anquan (没有网络安全就没有国家安全) [National Security Cannot Live Without 
Cyber Security], QIU SHI (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2015-
10/15/c_1116807805.htm.  
12 See, e.g., Du Yanyun (杜雁芸), Meiguo Wangluo Baquan Shixian de Lujing Fenxi 
(美国网络霸权实现的路径分析) [An analysis on how America achieved its cyber-
hegemony] 24 TAIPINGYANG XUEBAO (太平洋学报) 65, 75 (2016).  
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sovereignty to censorship, and cry foul against it accordingly.13 They 
insist upon the multi-stakeholder ‘Internet freedom’ theory.14 Under 
this vision, China’s conception of cyber sovereignty appears 
uncongenial and untenable. 15  This tit-for-tat debate forms a 
conventional framework of Internet governance model, a state-centric 
agenda represented by China versus an information freedom agenda 
represented by the Western observers. 
 
There has been a growing body of literature framing China’s cyber 
sovereignty through the lens of such an Internet governance model. 
Sarah Mckune and Shazeda Ahmed warned that China’s advocacy for 
Internet sovereignty could undermine multi-stakeholderism and its 
associated values, including transparency, accountability, and human 
rights.16 Zhang Xinbao and Xu Ke countered the censorship argument 
and criticized the hegemonic perspective of multi-stakeholderism.17 
Kristen Eichensehr contrasted China’s state-centric multilateralism 
with America’s bottom-up multi-stakeholderism, shedding light on 





13 See, e.g., Amy Chang, How the Internet with Chinese Characteristics Is Rupturing 
the Web, HUFFPOST (Feb. 14, 2015, 1:52 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/amy-
chang-/china-internet-sovereignty_b_6325192.html [https://perma.cc/4KCM-
YMUY]; Nick Lynall, Cyber Sovereignty: The Sino-Russian Authoritarian Model, 
FOREIGN BRIEF (Sep. 15, 2017), https://www.foreignbrief.com/tech-society/cyber-
sovereignty-sino-russian-authoritarian-model/ [https://perma.cc/ZC83-M2G4]; Scott 
Livingston, Beijing Touts “Cyber-Sovereignty” In Internet Governance: Global 




14 Internet Freedom, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/internet-freedom/. 
15 Scott Shackelford & Frank Alexander, China’s Cyber Sovereignty: Paper Tiger or 
Rising Dragon? ASIA & PACIFIC POL’Y SOC’Y (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.policyfo 
rum.net/chinas-cyber-sovereignty/ [https://perma.cc/2FCP-WRHK]. 
16 Sarah Mckune & Shazeda Ahmed, The Contestation and Shaping of Cyber Norms 
Through China’s Internet Sovereignty Agenda, 12 INT’L J. OF COMM. 3835, 3836 
(2018).  
17 Zhang Xinbao (张新宝), Xu Ke (许可), A Study on Cyberspace Sovereignty (网络
空间主权研究), 4 CHINA LEGAL SCI. 33 (2016).  
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a part of territory where censorship could happen.18 Hong Shen has 
pointed out that the inadequacy of this framework lies in its failure to 
examine the multifaceted power interactions among powerholders, 
perpetuating China’s state-centric authoritative image.19 This literature 
has made valuable contributions to our understanding of cyber 
sovereignty, but seems to limit discussions within the scope of Internet 
governance. 
 
Building upon Hong Shen’s argument, this article argues that such 
frameworks indeed reveal the most salient feature of China’s cyber 
sovereignty and its most fundamental difference from western cyber 
norms, but that it can also be misunderstood because it exonerates 
attempts made by Western governments to govern the Internet and 
limits China’s cyber sovereignty within the scope of censorship. If we 
understand China’s cyber sovereignty solely within this framework, 
the question becomes “whether the government should impose 
sovereign control on cyberspace”—which suggests the answer that 
China should not gain that control. But the real question is no longer 
about whether nations should exert sovereign control over the Internet, 
or which country has the legitimate right to do so. Scholars have 
recognized that even nations with the most “information freedom” also 
exert sovereign control.20 The crux of the question this paper tries to 
address is how much control is being exercised by China and how 
China’s approach evolves into a different, arguably bolder version 





18 Kristen Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 GEO. L.J., 317, 329-335 
(2015). 
19 Hong Shen, China and Global Internet Governance: Toward an Alternative 
Analytical Framework, 9 CHINESE J. OF COMM. 304, 306 (2016).  
20 Harold Koh, International Law in Cyberspace (September 18, 2012), 
https://20092017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm (comments at the 
USCYBERCOM Cyber Law Conference); James Lewis, Piecemeal Measures 
Regulate Cyberspace, CIPHER BRIEF (Feb. 26, 2017), https://cyberstability.org 
/news/piecemeal-measures-regulate-cyberspace/ [https://perma.cc/7VY6-799D] (“No 
country, except perhaps China, outright says it is extending sovereign control over 
the internet, and this lack of explicit pronouncements helps preserve the illusion that 
the internet is free and open. Instead, countries impose regulations for data protection 
and localization, to restrain hate speech or intellectual property theft, creating a 
piecemeal extension of sovereignty.”). 




To deconstruct this conventional framework and deepen our 
understanding of China’s cyber sovereignty, this article locates this 
concept within the wider scope of China’s social relations and political 
mechanisms. It aims to provide a systemic account of China’s unique 
interpretation of cyber sovereignty, unpacking conventional 
mythology to understand what China really means by that concept. It 
will contribute to the current literature by understanding this concept 
beyond the dichotomies of multi-stakeholderism and multilateralism; 
information freedom theory and authoritarian regimes; the liberal 
market; and state-nation constraints. To this end, it will apply 
Benckler’s framework of the three-layer principle, examining how 
China regulates the physical, logical, and content layer of the 
Internet.21 It argues that China’s long-standing cyber strategies of 
network security ("Wangluo Anquan") and information sovereignty 
("Xinxi Zhuquan") are embodied at the physical layer and the content 
layer respectively, and a more recent cyber-norm multilateralism 
agenda is advocated at the logical layer. Overall, cyber sovereignty is a 
combination of the network security at the physical layer, the 
information sovereignty at the content layer and the state-centric 
multilateral approach at the logical layer.  
 
Benckler’s framework is selected because China’s laws and legal 
documents demonstrate a layered regulatory design: the 
telecommunications department of the State Council and public 
security departments are assigned to maintain cybersecurity protection 
and supervision, which embodies the physical layer;22 the Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology is responsible for regulating 





21 See infra Section IV. 
22 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wangluo Anquan Fa (中华人民共和国网络安全
法) [Cybersecurity Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Nov. 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017) [hereinafter Cybersecurity Law], 
http://www.cac.gov.cn/2016-11/07/c_1119867116.htm  [https://perma.cc/7QTX-
MXPQ].  
23 (中国互联网域名管理办法) [Measures for the Administration of Internet Domain 
Names of China], (promulgated by Ministry of Industry & Information Technology, 
402 THE OHIO STATE TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16.2 
 
 
Cyberspace Administration of China is authorized to manage content 
regulation, which is the content layer. This three-layer analysis allows 
insight into how, and to what extent, China’s version of strong cyber 
sovereignty differs from other forms of weak cyber sovereignty.24 
Through the three-layer analysis, this article argues that in the eyes of 
Chinese officials, the Internet is essentially a state-owned 
communication tool with economic benefits: the political and 
ideological security of the government is the basic foundation of 
associated economic activities operated on the Internet. The concept of 
cyber sovereignty was employed to strike the right balance between 
the Internet as the property of a political party-state and its commercial 
activities; unlike other or weaker forms of cyber sovereignty in 
democratic countries. China instrumentalizes the concept of cyber 
sovereignty to impose strict control upon the physical, logical and 
content layers to maintain national and ideological security, while 
trying to maximize the growth of digital economy.  
 
This article will proceed as follows. First, it will describe three 
dimensions of cyber sovereignty: its physical and ideological 
contribution to national security, its economic protection to domestic 
tech-companies, and how it was contested between advocates and 
skeptics on an international level. This article argues that these three 
dimensions corroborate the conventional framework of Internet 
governance, a state-centric agenda represented by China opposed by 
an information freedom agenda represented by Western society.25 In 
order to present clear, complete and representative views from both 
sides, this article selects articles from academic journals, Chinese 
government-sponsored media and American government-assisted 
 
Sep. 30, 2000), at art. 3 [hereinafter Measures].  
24 The comparison of “weak cyber sovereignty” and “strong cyber sovereignty” 
derives from Dana Polatin-Reuben & Joss Wright, who define weak data sovereignty 
as “private sector-led data protection initiatives with an emphasis on the digital-
rights aspects of data sovereignty” and strong data sovereignty as favoring “a state-
led approach with an emphasis on safeguarding national security. See Dana Polatin-
Reuben & Joss Wright, An Internet with BRICS Characteristics: Data Sovereignty 
and the Balkanization of the Internet, paper presented at 4th USENIX WORKSHOP ON 
FREE AND OPEN COMMUNICATIONS ON THE INTERNET (FOCI 14) 1, 2 (2014). 
25 Hong Shen, supra note 19, at 2.  
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think-tanks. This article contends that the conventional framework is 
built upon partial facts presented by each side, and attempts to connect 
these narratives to deepen understanding for cyber sovereignty. 
 
Secondly, this article will discuss the technological, political and legal 
context of China’s Internet development. Specifically, it will introduce 
the regulatory mechanism of the Internet in each developmental period 
and the establishment of the Cyberspace Administration of China 
(CAC).26 Thirdly, it will discuss a three-layer scheme and investigate 
how the Chinese conception of cyber sovereignty is composed by three 
layers of the Internet—the physical layer, the logical layer, and the 
content layer. It will argue that China imposes strict control upon the 
physical, logical and content layers to maintain political stability, 
while trying to minimize its chilling effect on the growth of the digital 
economy. Ideological and political conflicts that occur at the content 
layer are the key that sheds light on vital differences between China 
and other states. Overall, with its ongoing efforts to strengthen Internet 
infrastructure security and content censorship, China has applied a 
narrow and controlling version of cyber sovereignty that censors 
Internet expression and activities.  
 
II. Three Dimensions of Cyber Sovereignty 
 
This section will unfold three major dimensions that lie beneath the 
concept of cyber sovereignty: cyber sovereignty contributes to ensure 
Internet security at the infrastructural and ideological dimension, 
provides a form of economic protectionism to Chinese high-tech 
industries at the economic dimension, and faces raising concerns from 
international community who questioned such concept would 
compromise universal values like information security and freedom of 
speech at the international dimension. Through exhibiting 
representative narratives from Chinese and Western scholars for each 
dimension, this paper identifies that the conventional framework is 
built upon partial facts presented by each side. This section attempts to 
reveal the limitation of this framework and connect these partial 





26 See infra Section II.C. 
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a. Infrastructure and Ideological Security 
 
The Internet was initially conceived by the United States during the 
Cold War; nowadays the key information infrastructure is still 
dominated by the U.S. During the initial adoption of the Internet in 
third-world countries, scholars raised concerns about technological 
dependence. Some worried that infrastructural monopoly would create 
unequal distribution and a digital divide, leading to asymmetric 
disadvantages for smaller, less connected developing countries.27  
 
China was, and still remains, one of these developing countries. While 
China might consider foreign infrastructure ownership an opportunity 
to attract foreign investment and accelerate economic prosperity, it 
always sees U.S. technical ascendency as a potential threat. The fact 
that the majority of root servers are located in the United States is 
emphasized by Chinese scholars as a legitimate reason to attain cyber 
sovereignty.28 They also worry that the U.S. entities registered the 
most popular mainstream domain names under the current IPv4 
system. Under the current Internet governance model, even though the 
U.S. government does not directly regulate the Internet naming 





27 See e.g., Juli L. Gittinger, Is There Such a Thing as ‘Cyberimperialism?,’ 28 
COMM. J. MEDIA & CUL. STUD. 509, 511 (2014); Linda Main, The Global 
Information Infrastructure: Empowerment or Imperialism?, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 83, 
(2001). It suggests that although Global Information Infrastructure created a global 
information market and narrowed the poverty gap, the U.S.-driven market is in risk 
of moving towards a two-tier technology society that perpetuates the old distinction 
between North and South, due to inadequate capacity and particular regional issue 
such as “the lack of regional, social and economic integration found in the USA” and 
“deep political, linguistic and cultural divisions that do not exist in the USA.” Linda 
Main, supra note 28, at 83.  
28 Chi Dongyang & Liu Quan (赤东阳&刘权), “Cong Wangluo Kongjian Guoji 
Hezuo Zhanlve Kan Woguo Weihu Wangluokongjian Zhuquan de Silu” (从《网络
空间国际合作战略看我国维护网络空间主权的思路》看我国维护网络空间主权
的思路) [Thoughts of Maintaining Cyberspace Sovereignty from China’s 
“International Cooperation Strategy of Cyberspace”] Z1 CYBERSPACE SECURITY (网
络空间安全) 1, 2 (2017).  
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society representatives who have technical advantages in designing the 
Internet infrastructure still largely represent U.S. interests.29 
 
As America’s technological hegemony struck fear among Chinese 
leadership, the imperative to improve the capacity of China’s own core 
Internet infrastructure was constantly emphasized. In 2016, President 
Xi pointed out that “Internet core technology is the greatest ‘vital 
gate,’ and the fact that core technology is controlled by others is our 
greatest hidden danger.”30 Developing core Internet infrastructure not 
only advances infrastructural security, it is also closely tied to 
economic development. he Report on China Internet Development 
2017 states that “[n]etwork infrastructure has become a new type of 
public infrastructure that promotes economic and social 
development.” 31  The rapid development of basic infrastructure 
underlines the central leadership’s fervent pursuit for technological 
independence.  
 
The Chinese emphasis on infrastructure independence has an 
ideological dimension as well. Paul Cornish recognizes that the cyber 
sovereignty debate in the PRC goes deeper than physical expression 
such as trade-offs and procedures; a more enduring aspect is cultural 





29 Sandeep Joshi, India to Push for Freeing Internet from U.S. Control, HINDU (Dec. 
7, 2013, 11:55 PM), http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/internet/india-to-
push-for-freeing-internet-from-%20us-control/article5434095.ece.; Kristen 
Eichensehr, supra note 18, at 347 ( “Although the United States supports the 
multistakeholder model at least in part for freedom of expression reasons, the 
bottom-up governance model also serves U.S. interests because many of the 
nongovernmental voices that the model amplifies, including technology companies 
and nongovernmental actors, have ties to the United States or share its values.”) 
30 Xi Jinping, Speech at The Work Conference for Cybersecurity and Informatization, 
CHINA COPYRIGHT & MEDIA (Apr. 19, 2016), https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordp 
ress.com/2016/04/19/speech-at-the-work-conference-for-cybersecurity-and-
informatization [https://perma.cc/3J3B-2KFX]. 




32 Paul Cornish, Governing Cyberspace through Constructive Ambiguity, 57 
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the free flow of information is employed to justify censorship,33 
Chinese scholars see malicious intentions behind the U.S. advocacy 
for “information freedom.” Chinese authorities fear that the Internet 
would erode Chinese ideological security34 if the Western conception 
of Internet freedom prevails,35 and that importing Western values 
would contribute to cultural imperialism.36 The exposure of the PRISM 
project reinforced that vision: that information freedom is a 
hypocritical diplomatic language to cover true intent; tearing down the 
 
SURVIVAL: ST. POWER & CLIMATE CHANGE 153, 164 (2015).  
33 DEAN CHENG, CYBER DRAGON: INSIDE CHINA’S INFORMATION WARFARE AND 
CYBER OPERATIONS, 1, 60 (2017) ( “[B]y delegitimizing the free flow of information, 
Chinese authorities would justify efforts to control what information can flow across 
state boundaries and could even seek assistance from other states in constricting that 
flow.”).  
34 Xu Qiang (徐强), Zengqiang Zhongguo Wangluo Wenhua Ruanshili (增强中国网
络文化软实力) [“To better advancing the soft power of China’s Internet culture”], 
QIUSHI (Jan. 11, 2018), http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/hqwg/201801/11/c_112224 
3467.htm.  
35 Michael Swaine, Chinese Views on Cybersecurity in Foreign Relations, 42 
LEADERSHIP MONITOR 1, 7 (2013)(pointing out that “the ‘ideological’ dimension of 
cybersecurity usually refers to the defense and expansion of “socialist ideology and 
culture.” Both civilian and military officials and observers assert that to protect 
China’s sovereignty and the authority of the PRC government, the Internet in China 
must reflect socialist “cyber culture” and resist “ideological infiltration and political 
instigation.”).  
36 See, e.g., Yin Xiaorong (殷晓蓉), “Meijie Diguo Zhuyi” he “Shuzi Honggou”—
Gainian Neihan Jiqi Shidai Yiyi de Fenxi Bijiao (“媒介帝国主义”和“数字鸿沟”—
概念内涵及其时代意义的分析比较) [a comparative analysis on the conception and 
significance of “media imperialism” and “digital divide”], ZHONGGUO CHUANBOXUE 
LUNTAN (中国传播学论坛) (2003) (pointing out that in the 60s and 70s, the battle 
around information freedom cropped up between the United States and developing 
countries who had Soviet Union’s back. At that time, when facing criticism on media 
imperialism, America used the idea of information freedom to defend itself and 
oppose developing countries’ inquiry to develop a new order for communications 
and journalism.); Du Yanyun (杜雁芸), supra note 10 (noting that Chinese scholars 
see the U.S. actively advocate for Internet freedom, harboring malicious intentions to 
establish an ideology hegemony by selling its so-called universal value of 
information freedom.). 
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digital border of other countries while immunizing its own.37 
 
Instead of shaping a free-flowing communication environment, 
proponents of cyber sovereignty believe that promoting a “positive 
energy” ideology ("zheng neng liang"), will allow the cultivation of a 
harmonious online environment. Min Jiang characterizes China’s 
cyber sovereignty as “authoritarian informationalism” that combines 
capitalism, authoritarianism, and Confucianism. 38 The Confucianism 
Jiang proposes is reflected in the national call to build a “clear 
environment on cyberspace” and “harmonize the Internet.” Employed 
to develop a cohesive, socialist nation, positive energy connotes a 
variety of meanings, including “patriotism,” “loyalty to the communist 
party,” “dedication to one’s work,” “honesty,” “filial piety,” and other 
culturally normative virtues.39 By reviving these Confucian values in 
cyberspace, Jiang suggests that the Party hopes to legitimize party rule 
and promote social order. President Xi’s remark in a CAC group 
meeting echoes this viewpoint. He stated that “we must . . . strengthen 
positive online propaganda, foster a positive, healthy, upward and 
benevolent online culture, use the Socialist core value view and the 
excellent civilizational achievements of humankind to nourish 
people’s hearts and nourish society.”40 
 
Therefore, cyber sovereignty should not be viewed simply as a brand 
new concept isolated from historical perspectives: the infrastructural 
and ideological concerns behind Internet sovereignty have been held 
long before the age of Internet.41 The Chinese worry that ideological 





37 Michael Swaine, supra note 33, at 7.  
38 See Min Jiang, Authoritarian Informationalism: China’s Approach to Internet 
Sovereignty, 30 SAIS REV. INT’L AFF. 71, 72 (2010).  
39 Derek Hird, Smile Yourself Happy: Zheng Nengliang and The Discursive 
Construction of Happy Subjects, in CHINESE DISCOURSES ON HAPPINESS (Gerda 
Wielander & Derek Hird eds, 2018).  
40 Xi Jinping, Xi Jinping Gives Speech at Cybersecurity and Informatization Work 
Conference, CHINA COPYRIGHT & MEDIA (April 19, 2016). 
41 See generally, Wenxiang Gong, Information Sovereignty Revisited, XIV 
INTERCULTURAL COMM. STU. 119, 120 (2005). 
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double standard 42 in their Internet strategy, establishing the U.S. 
hegemony with an Americanized Internet. Cyber sovereignty helps 
China both allocate critical Internet resources and resist American 
hegemony in terms of the spread of Internet freedom ideology. The 
Chinese authorities have always tried to utilize Western 
communication technologies, but at the same time curb its socio-
political and ideological impacts. 
 
b. Economic Empowerment Of Chinese Companies 
 
While China’s Internet-related business is developing increasingly 
quickly with broadband construction, many foreign companies left 
China due to strict data localization regulations and the censorship 
issue. Reports show that the Great Firewall has an adversarial impact 
on U.S. companies based in China.43 Only 5 percent of respondents 






42 Yu Li (余丽), Meiguo Hulianwang Zhanlve Jiqidui Zhongguo Zhengzhi Wenhua 
Anquan de Yingxiang (美国互联网战略及其对中国政治文化安全的影响) 
[American Internet Strategy and its Influences on Chinese Political and Cultural 
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Dominated by the Sovereignty Principle], LEGAL DAILY (July 23, 2015, 8:36 AM), 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/rdlf/content/2015-
07/23/content_6184990.htm?node=34014 [http://perma.cc/8UKL-AT7F] (stating 
that Li Zhong (李忠), the Director of the Institute of Law in the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences suggested that the PRISM project and documents revealed by 
WikiLeaks has created a delirious climate for the Internet, and that most countries 
cannot pretend nothing happened and not take measures to regulate the Web based 
on their territories). 
43 Paul Mozur & Carlos Tejada, China’s ‘Wall’ Hits Business, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13, 
2013, 9:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732392610457827 
7511385052752 [http://perma.cc/RHM7-TFLX]. 
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The departure of foreign companies left their Chinese domestic tech 
counterparts in a preponderant position to secure the Chinese market. 
For instance, a domestic company, Baidu, quickly grew to become 
Google’s substitute after its exit from mainland China in 2010: when it 
left China, Google controlled 40 percent of the Chinese search market, 
and Baidu accounted for roughly 65 percent of the Chinese search 
engine market in 2018.45 
 
Google is not the only foreign Internet platform provider that reeled 
from China’s regulatory hurdles. American dotcoms such as YouTube, 
Twitter, and Facebook all fell prey to the censorship mechanism. With 
the external competitors leaving, the internal companies thrived. 
Similar services were offered by Chinese-indigenous dotcoms, such as 
Sina Weibo, a Chinese-equivalent of Twitter, Youku, a Chinese-
homegrown alternative to YouTube, and WeChat, which successfully 
replaced Facebook and WhatsApp. Protectionist sentiment also has 
spilled into the 3G network arena.46 The rapid growth of China’s own 
tech superpowers leaves its global tech counterparts with an awkward 
dilemma—either adapt to China’s laws, or quit. 
 
Domestic companies did not remain content with a demographic 
dividend with the world’s largest e-commerce market. Three tech 
giants, Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent, also known as the BAT league, 
have attempted to move into “advanced industries” of cyber business, 
including semiconductors, chip materials, robotics, aviation 
equipment, and satellites.47 McKinsey Global Institute counts China as 
the top three in the world for venture-capital investment in key types 





45 Search Engine Market Share China: Mar 2019-2020, STATCOUNTER, 
http://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share/all/china/ 
[http://perma.cc/XWK8-N56M]. 
46 YU HONG, NETWORKING CHINA: THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE CHINESE 
ECONOMY 88 (2017).  
47 Michael Brown & Pavneet Singh, China’s Technology Transfer Strategy, DEFENSE 
INNOVATION UNIT EXPERIMENTAL (DIUX) (2018), https://admin.govexec.com/med 
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3-D printing robotics, drones, and artificial intelligence (AI).48 Their 
active exploration in artificial intelligence with Internet-based 
technologies have been supported by national policies, such as Internet 
Plus and Internet Power dream. By promoting innovations in Internet-
based commercial and management models to shape an Internet Plus 
ecosystem, these plans aim to integrate the Internet with traditional 
industries to realize another round of industrial and economic 
upgrading.49 Yu Hong suggested that China is revved up for “an 
upgraded digital capitalism” through Internet Plus, which also 
empowers private domestic companies to gain considerable political 
influence.50 
 
In the eyes of Beijing, these domestic government-registered actors are 
more politically reliable than their foreign counterparts. Since the early 
stage, Zhao identified that the media has to dance between the party 
line and the bottom line.51 Min Jiang and Rongbin Han extend the 
dance analogy into the Internet business landscape: compared to their 
international rivals, domestic companies or information providers have 
shown a “discontented compliance to eschew discussion of censorship 
out of fear of losing license.”52 This political compliance has cultivated 
a symbiotic relationship between the state and Chinese Internet 





48 Jonathan Woetzel et al., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, China’s Digital Economy: 
A Leading Global Force 2-3 (2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/ 
Featured%20Insights/China/Chinas%20digital%20economy%20A%20leading%20gl
obal%20force/MGI-Chinas-digital-economy-A-leading-global-force.ashx. 
49 Internet Plus: Premier Li’s New Tech Tool, The St. Council The People’s Republic 
of China (Mar. 13, 2015, 9:54 PM), http://english.gov.cn/premier/news/2015/03/13/ 
content_281475070887811.htm [http://perma.cc/M5XK-C3SP]. 
50 Yu Hong, Pivot to Internet Plus: Modeling Chinas Digital Economic 
Restructuring?, 11 INT’L J. OF COMM. 1486, 1499 (2017). 
51 YUEZHI ZHAO, MEDIA, MARKET, AND DEMOCRACY IN CHINA: BETWEEN THE 
PARTY LINE AND THE BOTTOM LINE (1998).   
52 RONGBIN HAN, CONTESTING CYBERSPACE IN CHINA: ONLINE EXPRESSION AND 
AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE 140 (2018); Min Jiang, Internet Companies in China: 
Dancing Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line,ASIE.VISIONS, JAN. 2012, at 
31.  
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national subsidies and investments for the high-tech industry to 
maximize economic gains. On the other hand, domestic companies 
have to be deferential to relevant governmental laws and regulations, 
maximizing political stability. Min Jiang and King-Wa Fu raised the 
social credit system to illuminate this relationship.54 While the state 
claims the system is used to rate the trustworthiness of citizens and 
business sectors, it can also be an instrumental tool for social control 
through surveillance of data. The domestic firms gather personal data 
that contribute to their businesses. With this data, the government can 
monitor and regulate individual behavior to maintain social stability.  
 
Interestingly enough, although power centralization and censorship is 
at an unprecedented level, the digital trade is also hitting its liberal 
potential. As the Chinese government seeks to spread global influence, 
Chinese Internet companies have been actively participating in 
economic flows of the global market. Lianrui Jia and Dwayne 
Winseck found extensive foreign investor ownership stakes in Baidu 
(7.5%), Alibaba (40%) and Tencent (45%), arguing that they have 
increasingly integrated into the global capital market.55 Moreover, in 
contrast to many fears driven by the data localization rule, Yu Hong 
noted that China-based centers welcome externally originated, cross-
border data flows. Paraphrasing the president of China Unicom, the 
clients for which China Unicom runs data centers include foreign 
clients, such as Amazon, Google, and Microsoft. 56  In addition, 
postponement of the strict cross-border transportation of data rule in 
the CSL also reflects China’s effort to preserve economic participation 
in the global market. Multinational countries worried that the incoming 
data localization rule would be detrimental to their businesses. China 
eventually decided to postpone the rule’s enforcement for 18 months, 





54 Id.  
55 Lianrui Jia & Dwayne Winseck, The Political Economy of Chinese Internet 
Companies: Financialization, Concentration, and Capitalization, 80 INT’L COMM. 
GAZETTE 30, 54 (2018). 
56 Hong, supra note 47, at 144.  
57 Sui-Lee Wee, China’s New Cybersecurity Law Leaves Foreign Firms Guessing, 
N. Y. TIMES (May 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/business/china-
cybersecurity-law.html [http://perma.cc/T9NT-NCXN].  
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Group, commented that “getting the cross-border data flow issue right 
is a prerequisite for Beijing’s efforts to promote economic 
globalization” and that “China is eager to avoid being seen as stifling 
digital trade.”58 Therefore, although China would not abandon its data 
localization and censorship strategy due to political stability concerns 
and benefits to domestic companies from this economic protectionism, 
it is not entirely accurate to characterize the economic consequence of 
cyber sovereignty as pure foreign exclusion.  
 
c. Critics From Information Freedom Theory 
 
China’s cyber sovereignty has received an especially negative 
international reception. However, China remains intransigent about 
exercising greater influence on cyber norms under the onslaught of 
international critics. Chinese officials have constantly raised UN 
documents to substantiate its cyber sovereignty claim. In 2015, 
President Xi, at the opening ceremony of the Second World Internet 
Conference, cited the principle of sovereign equality in the “Charter of 
the United Nations” to illustrate why “we should respect the right of 
individual countries to independently choose their own path of cyber 
development, model of cyber regulation and Internet public policies.”59 
Lu Wei, the former head of the General Office of the Central Leading 
Group for the Cyberspace Administration of China, writes that the 
spirit of the Charter of the United Nations entails the Internet’s 
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where Internet sovereignty arises. 61  It is not only the Chinese 
government that pushes hard on the Internet sovereignty multilateral 
governance approach internationally; Chinese scholars also spare no 
effort in emphasizing state sovereignty and territorial integrity.62 
 
As much as Chinese officials and scholars like to cite the UN 
Charter, 63  the UN’s Group of Governmental Expert (GGE) 
documents, 64  and the Tallinn Manual to advance its Internet 





61 Id.  
62 See infra Section IV.B.2; see, e.g., Bai Hao (白皓), Wangluo Kongjian 
AnquanZzhili de Zhongguo Zhuzhang—Yi Zhuquan Yuanze Wei Shijiao (网络空间
安全治理的中国主张—以主权原则为视角) [China’s viewpoint on Internet 
security governance based on territorial sovereignty principle], 4 Information 
Security And Communications Privacy (信息安全与通信保密) (2017) (raising the 
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Internet.”). 
63 Lu (鲁), supra note 57.  
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infrastructure within their territory.” U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Group of 
Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. 
A/70/174 (July 222, 2015). 
65 Chi & Liu (赤&刘), supra note 26; Fang Binxing (方滨兴), Zou Peng (邹鹏) & 
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essentially self-contradictory for the UN to incorporate China’s 
proposal.66 Mainstream media outlet publicities are tempted to view 
Russia and China’s quest for information sovereignty “as yet another 
stab at censorship and control.”67 Democratic countries who value 
more personal freedom than collective interests in cyberspace, reflect 
their divergence with China’s sovereignty assertion. For instance, the 
U.S. observed that China’s emphasis on asserting sovereignty over 
“citizens and organizations within their borders” is “a diverging 
perspective from the United States,” who “is highly protective of 
individual freedom of speech and other individual liberties, and views 
state efforts to control online content as ‘inappropriate’.”68 In addition, 
the rest of the UN Charter, which sheds light on the importance of 
protecting basic human rights and freedom of speech, is inherently 
incongruous with cyber sovereignty and censorship.69 Information 
freedom theorists worry this concept would allow the government to 
regulate the Internet more unscrupulously. Human rights organizations 
like Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) have made an appeal 
to the international community to demand that the government “amend 
relevant laws and regulations to remove restrictions on freedom of 
expression and the press, including for information on the Internet and 
sent through instant-messaging apps, that are not in accordance with 
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Universal Declaration on Human Rights.”70 
 
It is worth noticing that in the eyes of information freedom theorists, 
restricting the Internet to protect the security of cyber infrastructure is 
not unacceptable, but it “must go hand-in-hand with respect for the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms set forth in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.”71 They worry that because China’s 
Internet censorship is essentially antithetical to the freedom of speech, 
China’s attempt to codify its version of Internet sovereignty into 
international law might spread censorship. To the West, China’s 
pursuit of cyber sovereignty cannot simply be viewed as an act to 
implement cyber laws based on territorial borders; rather, it is an 
attempt to implement surveillance, heighten online speech censorship, 
and invade users’ privacy within Chinese territory.72 As commentators 
have put it, “if its philosophy of cyber sovereignty is even more widely 
enacted, many of us could one day find ourselves living behind the 





70 Xi Jinping’s “Cyber Sovereignty” Fast Eroding Space For Free Expression, China 
Human Rights Defenders (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.nchrd.org/2018/04/xi-
jinpings-cyber-sovereignty-fast-eroding-space-for-free-expression/ 
[http://perma.cc/7ERC-UXFT]. 
71 Tiezzi, supra note 66.  
72 Livingston, supra note 11 ( “[B]ut China’s conception of cyber-sovereignty is 
nothing less than a sharp realignment of the traditional conception of the Internet 
promoted in the developed world, from an open platform regulated by a diverse array 
of stakeholders, to one fragmented by national boundaries and regulated piecemeal 
by national governments. Under the Chinese conception of “’cyber-sovereignty” all 
forms of national censorship are equivalent.”); Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, The 
‘Chilling Effect’ of China’s New Cybersecurity Regime, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 10, 
2015, 3:27 P.M.)  http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/10/china-new-cybersecurity-law-
internet-security/ [http://perma.cc/BX85-NTT5] (quoting the Chinese Director at 
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However, Chinese leaders have been refusing to interpret cyber 
sovereignty as authoritarian control for three reasons. Firstly, in regard 
to Internet content censorship, they hold that China only censors 
malicious comments, but welcomes insightful criticism. In Xi’s speech 
at the Symposium on Cybersecurity and IT Application, he recognized 
the value of “kind criticism” contributing to the healthy development 
of the online environment. He stated that “to build a well-functioned 
Internet public sphere is not to censor all negative comments and only 
endorse a single perspective; it is to welcome, investigate, and learn 
lessons from the kind criticism but reject those comments which turn 
things upside down, mix the black with the white, spread rumors with 
malicious intentions, commit crimes[,] and override the Constitution.” 
It remains unclear how to draw a bright line between “kind criticism” 
and malicious comments, which could leave the decision to the whim 
of government officials. 
 
Secondly, China seems to embrace economic freedom in cyber 
cooperation. President Xi reiterated the necessity of “open Internet” 
("Hulianwang Kaifang") in his talk, stating that “the development of 
the internet knows no national or sectoral boundaries.” 74  It is 
imperative to recognize that the “open Internet” to which China refers 
does not share a similar meaning as in the traditional Western context 
of freedom of speech and information flow; rather, the Chinese 
understanding of “open Internet” encapsulates economic openness. 
Chinese leaders see the international cooperation to govern and 
develop the Internet based on a multilateral approach that requires 
participation from various governments as a form of “open Internet.” 
For example, China initiated the Digital Silk Road project, as a core 
component of the “Belt and Road Initiative,” to promote the 
construction of basic Internet infrastructure and international 
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Based on the broadband expansion and digital transformation, China 
deployed its major e-commerce players like the BAT, to encourage e-
commerce cooperation and “create a transparent digital economy” in 
the international ecosystem.76  
 
Thirdly, e-Government projects provide a venue for governmental 
officials to hear voices from the grassroots. China experimented with 
several e-participation trials to improve transparency during the digital 
age, from the “Government Online Project” that was established in the 
early stage, to the recent government petition forums and social media 
accounts that represent local governments. Scholars demonstrate that 
the e-Government projects do not simply fulfill window-dressing 
purposes, but instead have substantial influence on the improvement of 
government policies.77 Through analyzing the Local Leader Message 
Board (LLMB), which is a petition forum launched by the central 
media to allow citizens registering complaints to government leaders 
in their localities, researchers have found that lower-class citizens from 
rural districts, who comprised a substantial share of the LLMB 
petitions, have affected governmental policies, such as the Minimum 
Living Standard Guarantee Scheme (dibao).78 Moreover, criteria for 
censoring these online petitions seem to be more lenient. In an 
interview researchers conducted with LLMB staff, the staff disclosed 
that censorship mostly applies to personal attacks on top Chinese 
authorities and that “99.9% of the petitions are displayed exactly the 
way they were written.”79  
 
By discussing three main characteristics of China’s cyber sovereignty, 
this article describes a conventional cyber sovereignty framework: 
while the Chinese government believes that cyber sovereignty 
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77 See Junyan Jiang, Tianguang Meng & Qing Zhang, From Internet to Social Safety 
Net: The Policy Consequences of Online Participation in China, 32GOVERNANCE 
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advances national security and conforms to international law, 
international critics attack such concepts, positing that these concepts 
exclude international business competition and challenge international 
standards of human rights. This framework reveals some important 
perspectives of China’s cyber sovereignty, but has its limitations. It 
confines China’s cyber sovereignty to a single authoritative image 
without addressing how much control China asserts within the 
principle of cyber sovereignty. This paper will propose a three-layer 
analysis to showcase the Chinese vision on cyber sovereignty infra in 
section IV. Before presenting this analysis, however, it is imperative to 
examine how regulatory apparatuses were transformed with the 
development of the Internet.  
 
III. The Centralization Of Regulatory Institutions 
 
Common wisdom regarding China’s Internet development was that it 
occurred in three stages: the electric media revolution (1994-2000), the 
digital media age (2000-2014), and the age of Internet of Things 
(starting from 2014).80 Specific landmarks may vary, but the general 
existence of each stage is largely agreed upon. This section will 
discuss the three stages, and further illustrate how laws and associated 
political apparatuses evolved in the different periods. A review of 
China’s Internet history is necessary because it can 1) show how 
regulatory bodies centralized with the development of the Internet, and 
2) analyze the vital differences in the Internet’s early development 
between China and the West. Unlike in the United States, where the 
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championed, the main role China assigned to the Internet was to 
facilitate economic development. This long-standing instrumentalist 
view of the Internet sheds light on how China balances political 
stability and economic interoperability through the contemporary 
notion of cyber sovereignty. 
 
a. An Evolving Conception of the Internet in China 
 
Chinese authorities embraced the Internet as a technological means to 
promote industrial development when it first arrived in China.81 An 
electronic media revolution was launched concomitant with the 
massive development of industrialization and informationization 
projects between the 1980s and the 1990s. Especially after the mid-
1990s, the arrival of the Internet has promoted communications 
products and a liberalized market. Chinese authorities understood the 
Internet as nothing more than an efficient means of communication; 
great efficiency of transportation promotes great volumes of 
information traffic, which entails economic restructuring. They saw 
the Internet as an economically advantaged asset and leveraged 
policies to spur the development of Information Communication 
Technologies and National Information Infrastructure (“CNII”).82 With 
the privatization of telecommunications and the liberalization of the 
market, construction for network projects became a pillar for the 
national economy.  
 
During this electric revolution, Chinese leaders paid more attention to 
the Internet’s technological impacts than its socio-cultural impacts.83 
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construction, legislation was also focused on preserving the security of 
these infrastructural developments. 84  The safety of the Internet 
infrastructure and computer information systems is the top priority in 
cyberspace. Between 1994 and 2000, a series of laws and regulations85 
were promulgated addressing the infrastructural security issue. The 
first Internet regulation in China, published by the State Council in 
1994, designated the Ministry of Public Security to “supervise, inspect 
and guide security protection” and “investigate online criminal 
activities.” 86 The major goal of this regulation, as Article 1 describes, 
was to “protect the safety of computer information systems, [and] 
promote the application and development of computers.”87 Although 
some provisions88  mentioned content regulation, scholars tend to 
understand content regulation at this stage as a digital extension of 
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86 (中华人民共和国计算机信息系统安全保护条例) [Regulations of the People’s 
Republic of China for Safety Protection of Computer Information Systems] 
(promulgated by the State Council, Feb. 2, 1994), 
http://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=12136&CGid= 
[https://perma.cc/L538-9UJP]. 
87 Id. at art. 1.  
88 (音像制品管理条例) [Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Administration of Audio-Visual Products]  (promulgated by the State Council, 
August 25, 1994, effective Oct. 1, 1994); (电影管理条例) [Regulations on 
Administration of Film] (promulgated by the State Council, June 19, 1996, effective 
July 1, 1996), http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/roaof382/; (广播电视管理
条例) [Regulations on Broadcasting and Television Administration] (promulgated by 
the State Council, Aug. 11, 1997). 
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development of the Internet.89  
 
The heavy national investment in Internet architecture in the ‘90s 
underlies the prosperity of China’s Internet commercialization sector 
entering into the millennium. With the rapid commercialization of 
Internet-related sectors, Chinese officials expressed their optimism for 
the Internet’s capacity in promoting economic growth.90 Unlike the 
single-minded emphasis on physical infrastructure development in the 
initial stage, the social media stage saw the mushrooming of a variety 
of Internet services, including social networking, photo sharing, video 
and microblogging services, and other profit-generating cultural and 
social products. Instant messaging and communication platforms were 
among the ones nurtured the most aggressively. 
 
Meanwhile, the content delivered by the Internet began to alarm 
Chinese authorities. The Internet was no longer merely a delivery 
service: it started to form and perpetuate public spheres. Guobin Yang 
argued that the trade economy and government-supported policies 
have laid the vital conditions for the rise of the public sphere in 
China. 91  TV shows, online discussion boards, and broadcasting 
programs with political influences are being accessed nation-wide. 
Chinese collective identity is arguably being shaped over the Internet 
with two major forces: cyber-nationalism92 and grassroots social media 
resistance.93 But either applauding the rise of China as the Little 





89 Wang Rong (王融), supra note 80.  
90 See, e.g., YONGMING ZHOU, HISTORICIZING ONLINE POLITICS: TELEGRAPHY, THE 
INTERNET, AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 137 (2006); Yuezhi Zhao, Caught in The 
Web, in the Public Interest and the Battle for Control of China’s Information 
Superhighway, 2 INFO 41 (2000). 
91 Guobin Yang, The Internet and Civil Society in China: A Preliminary Assessment, 
12 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 453, 473 (2010).  
92 Christopher Hughes, Nationalism in Chinese Cyberspace, 13 CAMBRIDGE REV. 
INT’L AFF. 195, 203 (2000) (suggesting that by far the most popular campaigns in 
Chinese cyberspace to date have been linked to nationalist themes). 
93 GUOBIN YANG, THE POWER OF THE INTERNET IN CHINA: CITIZEN ACTIVISM 
ONLINE 28-31 (2009).  
94 The Little Pinks are a unique generation that has witnessed China’s economic 
boom in a peaceful age and growth in the Internet age. Unlike the one-way 
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migrant workers, their vigorous Internet expressions and offline 
collective actions potentially inherent, pose challenges to the coercive 
communication regulation and the authority of governmental 
propaganda institutions.95 
 
In response, the Chinese government implemented censorship 
mechanisms to cope with this intricate online environment. The year 
2000 can be identified as the watershed between the first electric stage 
and the second social media stage; during this year, China published 
the first regulation specifically targeted at Internet content.96 This was 
preceded by a decision97 issued by the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress which included ideological security more 
noticeably than the infrastructural construction it emphasized in the 
previous stage. China gradually published regulations in the forms of 
“stipulations” (“Guiding”), “management measures” (“Guanli Banfa”), 
and “notices” (“Tongzhi”), which censor “subversive,” “harmful,” and 
“obscene” content as “endangering to national security.”98 Internet 
news publications also began facing higher levels of restriction.99 
Additionally, regulations related to Internet-based commercial 
activities such as Internet protocols, 100  e-commerce,101  and public 
 
propaganda machine, the Little Pinks are a walking propaganda group that has 
genuine faith in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP). 
95 Gary King, Jennifer Pan & Margaret Roberts, How Censorship in China Allows 
Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 
2 (2013).  
96 (互联网信息服务管理办法) [Regulation on Internet Information Service of the 
People’S Republic of China] (promulgated by the State Council, Sep. 25, 2000). 
97 (全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于维护互联网安全的决定) [Decision of the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Regarding Safeguarding 
Internet Safety] (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress, Dec. 28, 2009), http://www.cac.gov.cn/2000-12/29/c_133158942.htm 
[https://perma.cc/UMF6-H6S9]. 
98 YUEZHI ZHAO, COMMUNICATION IN CHINA 28 (2008).  
99 (互联网站从事登载新闻业务管理暂行规定) [Interim Provisions of the 
Information Office of the State Council and the Ministry of Information Industry on 
the Administration of Internet Websites' Engaging in News Publication Services], 
(promulgated by the State Council, Nov. 17, 2000). 
100 Measures, supra note 23.  
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health102 were promulgated in response to the staggering growth of 
Internet applications. 
 
Moving into the current age of Internet of Things (“IoT”), the Internet 
has allowed an explosive expansion of applications with a higher level 
of digital penetration; the e-commerce sector experienced exponential 
growth, from less than 1% of the global e-commerce market to 42% in 
ten years.103 Communication platforms have equipped consumers not 
only with a place to chat, but also a hub for education, information 
services, entertainment, e-commerce, and social interactions. The 
number of financial technology unicorns in China is growing 
competitively in the global market with their active exploration of 
financial areas including consumer finance, online personal financial 
investment, online insurance, and so on. The Internet economy has 
expanded from building telecommunication networks in the previous 
stage to proprietary platforms. 104  Cyberspace became a unique 
ecological field inhabited by national military missions, traditional 
offline industries, high-tech innovation businesses, with all existing 
previous stages embedded.  
  
Like the two previous stages, the way the Chinese government 
 
101 (财政部关于印发《互联网销售彩票管理暂行办法》的通知) [Notice of the 
Ministry of Finance on Issuing the Interim Measures for the Administration of Sales 
of Lottery via Internet], (promulgated by Ministry of Finance, Sep. 26, 2010); (国家
食品药品监督管理局关于加强互联网药品信息服务和互联网药品交易监督管理
工作的通知)[Notice of the State Food and Drug Administration about Strengthening 
the Supervision and Administration over the Drug Information Services on the 
Internet and Drug Transaction Services on the Internet] (promulgated by the State 
Food and Drug Administration, Aug. 22, 2006).  
102 (互联网医疗保健信息服务管理办法) [Administrative Measures for Internet 
Medical and Health Information Services] (promulgated by Ministry of Health, May. 
1, 2009, effective July 1, 2009).  
103 Rob Smith, 42% Of Global E-Commerce Is Happening in China. Here’s Why, 
WORLD ECON. F. (April 10, 2018), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/42-of-
global-e-commerce-is-happening-in-china-heres-why/ [https://perma.cc/DZ7F-
PDQV]. 
104 Jun Xia, Convergence and Liberalization in China’s ICT Sector: New Market and 
New Ecosystem, 40 TELECOMM.POL’Y 81, 82-84 (2016). 
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responded to technological change has transformed along with the 
development of the technology itself. In response to the booming 
market, the Internet was liberalized, with the government showing 
tolerance, which allowed digital companies some space to experiment 
before enacting laws and regulations. However, being supportive does 
not mean the authorities were satisfied with the fact that there was only 
one law105 designed for the Internet until 2014. The Chinese authorities 
understood the Internet space as a novel and separated domain: a 
political, military, and ideological battlefield as well as a booster for 
economic growth. Cyberspace is the “fifth domain” after Land, Sea, 
Air, and Space, which calls for rigorous regulations.106 China further 
publishes various administrative laws (“Xingzheng Fagui”), normative 
documents (“Guifanxing Wenjian”), and departmental rules (“Bumen 
Guiding”) to mediate Internet business activity107 and relevant media 
publicity.108 These strict regulations and measures reflected the fact 
that China has been paying particular attention to cyber security and 
content regulation in order to preserve the operations relied on in the 





105 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Dianzi Qianming Fa (中华人民共和国电子签名
法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Electronic Signature], (promulgated 
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 1, 2005). 
106 OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL LEADING GROUP FOR CYBERSPACE, NATIONAL 
CYBERSPACE SECURITY STRATEGY PART I 182 (2018) ("Cyberspace has become a 
new area for important human activity of equal importance to land, sea, air and 
space, state sovereignty has extended and stretched into cyberspace, sovereignty in 
cyberspace has become an important component part of state sovereignty.”). 
107 See, e.g., (外国机构在中国境内提供金融信息服务管理规定) [Provisions on 
Administration of Provision of Financial Information Services in China by Foreign 
Institutions] (promulgated by the State Council Information Office, Ministry of 
Commerce and State Administration for Industry and Commerce, Apr. 30, 2009, 
effective June 1, 2009); (规范互联网信息服务市场秩序若干规定) [Several 
Provisions on Regulating the Market Order of Internet Information Services] 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Dec. 29, 
2011, effective Mar. 15, 2012).  
108 (互联网新闻信息服务管理规定) [Provisions for the Administration of Internet 
News Information Services] (promulgated by the Cyberspace Administration of 
China, May 2, 2017, effective June 1, 2017). 
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Section IV.  
 
b. The Problem of “Nine Dragons Tamed the Flood” 
 
Even as laws were being promulgated, an overarching supervisory 
body was missing.109 Before 1998, regulatory frameworks were mainly 
oriented to the protection of cyber security on the infrastructural level 
by four sets of state apparatus: the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications (“MPT”), the Ministry of Electronics Industry 
(“MEI”), the State Education Commission (“SEC”), and the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences (“CAS”).110 They were functioning together to 
represent decision-making on a national level. Additionally, other 
Ministries and departments managed Internet-related operations within 
each traditional sector. For instance, although the State Administration 
of Press and Publication did not share executive power with those four 
organs, it was responsible for managing Internet-publishing 
newspapers and magazines.111  
 
Scholars pointed out two major problems with the bureaucratic 
framework. First, bureaucratic cooperation among government 





109 The supervisory function was designated to non-exclusive governmental entities. 
For example, relevant laws granted the Ministry of Public Security the supervising 
duties and the office of Leading Group for Information Technology Advancement in 
1994 and 1998 respectively. See State Council, (中华人民共和国计算系统安全保
护条例) [The Regulations of the People’s Republic of China for the Safety 
Protection of Computer Information Systems] (promulgated by the State Council, 
Feb. 18, 1994), art. 17, and (中华人民共和国计算机信息网络国际联网管理暂行
规定实施办法) [Implementation Rules for Provisional Regulations of the 
Administration of International Networking of Computer Information in the People's 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the State Council, Feb. 13, 1998), art. 5. 
110 (中华人民共和国计算机信息网络国际联网管理暂行规定) [Interim 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Management of International 
networking of Computer Information] (promulgated by the State Council, May. 20, 
1997), art. 7.  
111 New Regulations on Newspapers and Magazines Go Into Effect December 1, 
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA (Jan. 4, 2006), 
https://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/new-regulations-on-
newspapers-and-magazines-go-into-effect-december [https://perma.cc/DAR3-BZ79]. 
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Tan identified the MPT’s loss of control over telecommunications 
policy early on, when its proposal to draft a telecommunications law in 
consultation with other Ministries was quashed in 1995.112 They 
observed that “the MPT has never been able to get out of the stage of 
producing drafts; other Ministries, notably MEI, keep vetoing 
them.”113 Scholars also noted that the rivalry between the MPT and 
MEI “had become intense” and “services provided by the two 
government agencies almost completely overlapped.” 114  Some 
attributed this phenomenon to China’s administrative structure and 
general institutional environment.115 They suggested that due to the 
self-reliance within each ministry, “department heads had every 
incentive to expand their own empires and little incentive to contract 
out for services that could be provided by others.”116 
 
The second problem was that Internet infrastructure issues usually 
went beyond the capacity of those four state entities. For example, 
when the rivalry between the MPT and MEI bogged down in 
stalemate, the chief administrative authority, China’s State Council, 
was often expected to step in and mediate disputes. The power to 
negotiate key national plans was limited and therefore often escalated 
to political levels above the MPT due to “the importance attached to 
the information superhighway.”117 The first problem—the failure to 
confer within the four governmental entities—revealed the weakness 
inside and triggered the second problem, which required opinions from 
a more centralized entity outside.  
 
Stepping into the digital media age, China recognized the weakness of 
this dispersed institutional structure and started to centralize the media 
system by spinning off governmental organs regulating the Internet. 
The National Informationization Leading Group, founded in 2001, was 





112 MILTON MUELLER & ZIXIANG TAN, CHINA IN THE INFORMATION AGE: 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE DILEMMA OF REFORM 61-62 (1997).  
113 Id. at 62.  
114 SUDWEEKS & ROMM, supra note 81, at 242. 
115 MUELLER & TAN, supra note 112.  
116 Id. at 47.  
117 Id. at 54.  
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of the Party, compared to previous leading groups organized by the 
State Council. This bureaucratic upgrade allowed the government to 
conduct top-down administrative orders more directly. Moreover, in 
1998, the MPT and the MEI were merged into a newly designed 
Ministry of Information Industry (“MII”) to “reduce the fragmentation 
of China’s information industry.”118  The new department mainly 
administered industry and commerce relevant to the Internet. In 2008, 
the new Ministry of Information Industry and Technology (“MIIT”) 
was established to replace and continue the functions of the MII and 
the Information Office of the State Council. In 2011, China set up the 
State Internet Information Office (“SIIO”), which is responsible for 
managing Internet content. The SIIO is the original form of the super-
office Cyberspace Administration of China (“CAC”). The MIIT and 
the SIIO worked together with the Ministry of Public Security, which 
regulates online criminal activities,119 constituting three major forces 
which empower China’s top leaders to oversee the Chinese 
cyberspace. This bureaucratic reshuffling not only reflects a deeper 
level of centralization, it also implies that Internet regulation at this 
stage mainly focused on the enterprise units and political stability.  
 
The white paper Internet in China characterizes the Internet as “an 
engine promoting the economic development of China.”120 National 
plans have set the goal of “using IT to propel industrialization” and 
“pushing forward national economic informationization by vigorous 
development of the Internet industry.” 121  Exponential growth in 
Internet penetration accelerated the online entertainment industry such 
as online games, music downloads, and news updates. Driven by 
market pressure, the MII promulgated regulations regarding wireless 







118 NEGRO, supra note 80, at 26.  
119 (计算机信息网络国际联网安全保护管理办法) [Computer Information Network 
and Internet Security, Protection and Management Regulations] (promulgated by 
Ministry of Public Security, Dec. 11, 1997, effective Dec. 30, 1997), art. 3.  
120 INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF CHINA, supra note 4, at 4.  
121 Id. at 2.  
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Increasing concerns about political and ideological stability were 
reflected by the creation of new regulatory departments that were 
required to stake out and censor sensitive Internet content. Multiple 
traditional agencies designed relevant branches that were given 
specific purview over Internet content regulation. For instance, the 
State Council General Office launched the Internet Information 
Management Bureau in early 2000, which was responsible for 
coordinating national Internet news publication.122  
 
Previous problems in cooperation extended to these new entities. That 
is, the assignment of responsibility to regulatory bodies was 
fragmented by sector, but functionally overlapping. As such, conflicts 
between Ministries had become increasingly intense since the 
establishment of the MII.123 For instance, Jack Qiu noted that the core 
of China’s media control system was steered by stakeholders who 
uphold Leninist principles and “may not think in line with MII 
technocrats.”124 Unlike the MII, some core agencies such as the CCP 
Central Propaganda Department, State Council Information Office, 
Ministry of Public Security (“MPS”), State Secrecy Bureau (“SSB”), 
and the People’s Liberation Army (“PLA”) prioritize the promotion of 
a positive image of CCP leaders and a harmonious China over 
developing the national economy.125 Departments following different 
lodestars could result in compromised efficiency. The Chinese named 
this phenomenon “Nine Dragons Tamed the Flood;” many dragons 
working collaboratively could manage the flood, but in the end, they 
failed due to inefficient cooperation.126  
 





122 Yuezhi Zhao, The State, the Market, and Media Control in China, in WHO OWNS 
THE MEDIA: GLOBAL TRENDS AND LOAL RESISTANCE 179, 180 (Pradip Thomas & 
Zohram Nain ed., 2004).  
123 NEGRO, supra note 80.  
124 Jack Qiu, The Internet in China: Data and Issue, 1, 11 (Oct. 1, 2003) (unpublished 
manuscript).  
125 Id.  
126 YA-WEN LEI, THE CONTENTIOUS PUBLIC SPHERE: LAW, MEDIA, AND 
AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN CHINA, 175 (2017). 
127 当“魔兽”遇上“行政审批,” 网络游戏到底归谁管？[When "Warcraft" Meets 
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The Ministry of Culture, State Administration of Press, Publication, 
Radio, Film and Television (“SARFT”), and General Administration 
of Press and Publication all directly supervise the import of foreign 
Internet video games. However, their disagreements about importing 
the video game World of Warcraft remain unresolved. On one hand, 
the Ministry of Culture issued a provision in 2003, Article 15 of which 
stipulated that “the import of Internet cultural products shall be 
conducted by operational Internet cultural entities which have obtained 
an Internet Culture Business Permit issued the cultural administrative 
departments.” 128 On the other hand, in 2004, the SARFT hosted a 
game management and importation workshop to discuss whether to 
publish “World of Warcraft.” It published a series of laws written to 
protect minors from addiction to video games, to regulate gambling 
with video games, and to publish Chinese ethical video games.129 The 
ill-functioned, overlapping role was inimical to the importing process.  
 
Once again, the State Council played the role of mediator. It published 
a notice130 which transferred the functions of “animation and network 
 
"Administrative Approval," who cares about online games?], TMT POST (Jun. 6, 
2016), http://www.tmtpost.com/1901818.html [https://perma.cc/94ZT-MVQV]. 
128 Hùliánwǎng wénhuà guǎnlǐ zhàn háng guīdìng (互联网文化管理暂行规定) 
[Interim Provisions on the Administration of Internet Culture] (promulgated by 
Ministry of Culture, May 10, 2003, effective July 1, 2003).  
129 See Guānyú shíshī “zhōngguó mínzú wǎngluò yóuxì chūbǎn gōngchéng” de 
tōngzhī (关于实施“中国民族网络游戏出版工程”的通知) [Notice Regarding the 
Implementation of the Chinese Nationality Online Game Publication Project], 
(issued by SAPPRFT, Aug. 3, 2004); Guānyú bǎohù wèi chéngnián rén shēnglǐ 
jiànkāng shíshī wǎngluò yóuxì fáng chénmí xìtǒng de tōngzhī (关于保护未成年人
身心健康实施网络游戏防沉迷系统的通知) [Notice on Protecting the Physical and 
Mental Health of Minors and Implementing the Online Game Anti-addiction 
System], (promulgated by SAPPRFT, MIIT and six other departments of the State 
Council, Apr. 13, 2007). 
130 Guówùyuàn bàngōng tīng guānyú yìnfā wénhuà bù zhǔyào zhízé nèi shè jīgòu hé 
rényuán biānzhì guīdìng de tōngzhī (国务院办公厅关于印发文化部主要职责内设
机构和人员编制规定的通知) [Notice of the General Office of the State Council on 
Issuing the Provisions on the Main Functions, Internal Bodies and Staffing of the 
Ministry of Culture] (promulgated by the General Office of the State Council, July 
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game administration and related industrial planning, industrial bases, 
project construction, trade fairs and market supervision of the SARFT” 
to the Ministry of Culture, but not the required pre-approval for the 
online publishing of network games. The pre-approval for publishing 
network games was reserved for the SARFT.131 
 
These notices did not seem to settle the dispute. After obtaining the 
green light from the Ministry of Culture, but not from the SARFT, 
“World of Warcraft” was launched by NetEase, one of the largest 
websites in China. The SARFT expressly announced that without pre-
approval for publishing network games, it was not legitimate to launch 
the game simply based on permission from the Ministry of Culture. In 
the end, World of Warcraft resumed operation several days after 
“website maintenance.” It is not publicly known how NetEase officers 
managed to persuade the SARFT.  
 
c. The Birth of the Cyberspace Administration of China 
 
After the chaotic events created by the dragon problem, power 
consolidation reached its pinnacle with the launch of Cyberspace 
Administration of China (“CAC”), also known as the Office of the 
Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, in 2014. Cyber sovereignty 
was born at a time when the Internet industry exhibited increasing 
technological complexity and challenges, which contributed to the 
consolidation of legislative and executive power into one super-office, 
the CAC. This article analyzes two aspects of the CAC. First, unlike 
state-led organizations in the electric age in which authorities’ 
attention was pinpointed on a single focal area of infrastructural 
 
11, 2008).  
131See generally Guówùyuàn bàngōng tīng guānyú yìnfā guójiā xīnwén chūbǎn zǒng 
shǔ (guójiā bǎnquán jú) zhǔyào zhízé nèi shè jīgòu hé rényuán biānzhì guīdìng de 
tōngzhī (国务院办公厅关于印发国家新闻出版总署(国家版权局)主要职责内设
机构和人员编制规定的通知) [Notice of the General Office of the State Council on 
Printing and Distributing the Provisions on the Main Functions and Institutions of 
the State Administration of Press and Publication (National Copyright 
Administration)]  (promulgated by the General Office of the State Council, July 11, 
2008). 
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development, and equally unlike other central leading groups in the 
social media age who employed multi-dimensional regulation, for the 
first time, the CAC expanded its regulation into various explosively 
growing sectors and encompassed a wide range of regulatory areas. 
Second, the CAC is entitled to an unprecedented power to coordinate 
among other bureaucratic organizations, which provides an 
institutional environment that can resolve the “Nine Dragon Tamed the 
Flood” problem. 
 
The Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization, 
renamed as the Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission 
in 2018, is the most recently refurbished central “Leading Group” 
designed for Internet development. However, it is not the first. During 
the initial infrastructural development stage, the State Council 
established the first state organization in charge of the Internet in 
1982: the “Leading Group on Computers and Large-Scale Integrated 
Circuits,” which was led by former Vice Prime Minister, Wan Li. To 
underline THIS unified leadership, in 1984 the State Council decided 
to upgrade the organization to the “leading group office of the 
rejuvenation of [the]electronic information industry,” with the primary 
responsibility of steering nationwide work on infrastructural 
development. Shifting into China’s modernization and 
industrialization age, the “State Council Informatization Leading 
Group” and “National Informatization Leading Group” were 
established to supplant their predecessors in 1999 and 2001, 
respectively. As their names signify, their primary responsibilities 
included generating policy proposals and coordinating strategic 
implementation for China’s informatization security and economic 
development. Therefore, for the issuance of significant policies 
relevant to the authority of Ministries and committees, various 
temporary organizations like “leading groups” were established to 
operate pertinent issues or policies.132 Every time the key area of 
Internet development shifted - from physical circuits to infrastructural 
development, or from electronic information industry to 





132 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD 
REVIEW OF INNOVATION POLICY: CHINA (2008).  
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but also a shift in policymaker focus.  
 
Unlike previous leading groups which mainly undertook techno-
infrastructure and economic perspectives, the CAC committed itself to 
newly-refined responsibilities that encompass duties performed by 
previous ones, such as infrastructure security, online content 
regulation, and new areas like e-commerce and data protection.133 The 
broad range of responsibilities incorporating related sectors that never 
appeared in cyberspace until the social media age reflect the fact that 
Chinese authorities have expanded their understanding of the Internet. 
The Internet is no longer simply a technological tunnel to deliver 
information; Chinese officials have started to identify the Internet as a 
technology whose content can be altered by influencing the physical 
tunnel.134 The reason why content regulation did not appear until the 
birth of CAC is not because government officials never intended to 
build a centralized governmental entity; it is because the formation of 
each Central Leading Group is reflective of the Internet’s trend 
towards social development. The dynamics of e-commerce, online 
activism, and content regulation were not adequately developed to 
cross over by the governmental officials until the age of Internet of 
Things.  
 
The CAC’s second feature is its unprecedented authority in 
coordinating state institutions. Compared to other Leading Groups, the 
CAC is more centralized. If necessary, the CAC is able to coordinate 
government entities, such as the National People’s Congress, the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party, and other Ministries; 
previously, this was difficult to accomplish. The CAC did not replace 
the dragons; relevant departments still manage and supervise their 





133 Weishan Miao &Wei Lei, Policy Review: The Cyberspace Administration of 
China, 12 GLOBAL MEDIA AND COMM. 337, 338 (2016). 
134 Marshall McLuhan coined the phrase “the medium is the message,” which means 
the nature of the medium can alter the content being transported within the medium. 
MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN PART I, 
7 (1964). In this regard, the Chinese authorities started being aware of how the 
physical tunnel of the Internet started to transform activities conducted through the 
Internet.  
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multiple government entities. At the helm of President Xi Jinping, this 
top-level supra-ministerial regulatory body primarily oversees Chinese 
cyberspace operations and executes policies. The Cyber Security Law 
(“CSL”) was hitherto the most significant law it has promulgated.135  
 
The CAC’s consolidating power is authorized by Article 8 of the 
Cyber Security Law. Article 8 stipulates that “the national cyberspace 
administration shall be responsible for the overall planning and 
coordination of cybersecurity work and relevant supervision and 
administration.” As for the Nine Dragons, the State Council’s 
telecommunications department, public security departments, and 
other relevant authorities mentioned before, “shall be responsible for 
cybersecurity protection, supervision and administration within the 
scope of their respective functions in accordance with the provisions of 
this Law and other relevant laws and administrative regulations.”136 
Other legal documents and official opinions underline that the CAC 
performs with a uniform function and an authoritative work 
mechanism “on a centralized basis.”137 
 
Although the CAC has been given unprecedented oversight power, 





135 Cybersecurity Law, supra note 22.  
136 Id. at art. 8.  
137 Zhōngyāng wǎngluò ānquán hé xìnxī huà lǐngdǎo xiǎozǔ bàngōngshì, guójiā 
zhìliàng jiāndū jiǎnyàn jiǎnyì zǒngjú, guójiā biāozhǔnhuà guǎnlǐ wěiyuánhuì guānyú 
jiāqiáng guójiā wǎngluò ānquán biāozhǔnhuà de ruògān yìjiàn (中央网络安全和信
息化领导小组办公室、国家质量监督检验检疫总局、国家标准化管理委员会关
于加强国家网络安全标准化的若干意⻅) [Several Opinions of the Office of the 
Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs, General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine and the Standardization Administration of 
the People's Republic of China on Strengthening National Cybersecurity 
Standardization Work] (promulgated by the Office of the Central Leading Group for 
Cyberspace Affairs, Aug. 12, 2016) (suggesting that “[a] uniform and authoritative 
work mechanism of national standards shall be established. The cybersecurity 
standardization work shall adhere to uniform planning and deployment… and the 
support of relevant competent cybersecurity departments, uniformly undertake the 
technical aspects of national cybersecurity standards on a centralized basis, and 
uniformly organize the application in relation to such standards.”).  
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performing tasks in relevant sectors.138 The next section will apply 
Benckler’s framework of the three-layer principle, which analyzes 
how administrative bodies regulate based on the physical layer, the 
logical layer, and the content layer. 
 
IV. Reconceptualizing Chinese Cyber Sovereignty: A Three-Area 
Analysis  
 
Yochai Benkler developed a three-layer model of Internet architecture. 
Fundamental Internet infrastructures operate at the physical layer, 
software servers and TCP/IP Protocols and standards make up the 
logical layer, and data and content transactions occupy the content 
layer.139 This article analyzes the CSL and its supporting explanatory 
documents through the lens of how China wields cyber sovereignty on 
each layer in the age of Internet of Things. It argues that through 
installing hefty responsibilities on critical network operators to 
cooperate and to defend cyber-attacks, China intends to gain network 
security at the physical level. Based on its persistent efforts to terrorize 
cyberspace, China tries to tout the idea of cyber sovereignty and the 
multilateral model to the international community at the logical layer. 
Finally, for the content layer, although China allows Internet content 
providers to make occasional violations of the law through the 
administrative development of the “interview mechanism,” central 
control of online content production to ensure information sovereignty 
demonstrates a strong incentive to cement political stability. In short, 
cyber sovereignty is the combination of network security at the 
physical layer, the multilateral model at the logical layer, and 





138 Cybersecurity Law, supra note 22, at art. 8 (stating that “[t]he national cyberspace 
administration shall be responsible for the overall planning and coordination of 
cybersecurity work and relevant supervision and administration. The competent 
telecommunications department of the State Council, public security departments 
and other relevant authorities shall be responsible for cybersecurity protection, 
supervision and administration within the scope of their respective functions in 
accordance with the provisions of this Law and other relevant laws and 
administrative regulations.”). 
139 Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture 
and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 848 (2004).  




a. Infrastructural Perspectives of Cyber Sovereignty 
 
Technological infrastructure, like a data center or root server, operates 
at the physical layer. As such, technological infrastructure is localized 
at one place - For instance, if Microsoft sets up a data center in 
Mainland China, this data center cannot go elsewhere. This physical 
exclusivity entails territory sovereignty.140 The Tallinn Manual 2.0 
characterizes the physical layer of cyberspace as “self-evidently” 
confined to states’ sovereignty.141 This layer is the only concrete level 
that people can see and touch; it includes the copper wire, optical 
cable, satellite facilities, and other technical components that 
information flows rely upon. This section will emphasize China’s 
efforts to protect the physical layer, maintaining technological 
independence and territorializing critical infrastructure. Further, it will 
introduce how China might spread censorship overseas through DNS 
cache pollution and building Internet infrastructure for developing 
countries–which raises doubts in the international community.  
 
i. Strict Regulation of Cyber Infrastructure 
 
Because the physical layer is the fundamental foundation of the logical 
and content layers, attacks on the physical layer are pervasive 
phenomena that could result in significant consequences for the 
nonphysical network. The 2010 Stuxnet computer virus, for example, 
exploited the vulnerability of Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities. The 
2012 Flame malware collected private data, and the 2017 WannaCry 
ransomware worm invaded high-profile national systems. All of these 
examples underline the vulnerability of cyber infrastructure. Many 
countries prioritize technological independence at the physical layer as 





140 RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 6 (2010); Stephen Dycus, 
Congress's Role in Cyber Warfare, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 155, 165 
(2010). 
141 MICHAEL N. SCHMITT ET AL., TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013).  
436 THE OHIO STATE TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16.2 
 
 
infrastructure, especially for critical infrastructure. 
 
At the initial stage in the 1990s, China’s cyber infrastructure was not 
as well-developed as other countries. Chinese leaders were acutely 
aware that the unadorned national network infrastructure, especially in 
critical fields, overly relied on foreign imports.142 As such, critical 
infrastructure has occupied a central spot in ensuring security within 
China’s cybersecurity policy. Early on, legal documents generally held 
that computer security should emphasize “the maintenance of the 
safety of computer information systems in such important fields as 
State affairs, economic development, national defense and top science 
and technology.” 143  Nowadays, President Xi pointed out that 
“[i]nfrastructural development in key fields such as finance, energy, 
electric power, communication, and transportation are the neural 
centers of cyber security.”144 The CSL identifies Critical Information 
Infrastructure (“CII”) as vital to “state security, the national economy 
and the people’s livelihood and public interest.”145 China has started 
making significant strides to design independent Internet architecture. 
Additionally, extensive national plans encompassing a variety of fields 





142 SCOTT WARREN HAROLD, ASTRID STUTH CEVALLOS & MARTIN C. LIBICKI, 
GETTING TO YES WITH CHINA IN CYBERSPACE 69 (2019).  
143 See, e.g., Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó jìsuànjī xìnxī xìtǒng ānquán bǎohù tiáolì (
中华人民共和国计算机信息系统安全保护条例) [Regulations of the People's 
Republic of China on Computer Information System Security Protection] 
(promulgated by State Council of the People's Republic of China, Feb. 18, 1994), 
Article IV.  
144 Communist Chinese Fundamentals: Strategic Thinking of Network Power, RED 
DRAGON 1949 (Jan. 2, 2019), https://reddragon1949.com/chinas-informatization-中
國信息化/communist-chinese-cyber-fundamentals-strategic-thinking-of-network-
power-共產主義中國網絡基礎：網絡/ [https://perma.cc/7BX9-FY3Q]. 
145 Cybersecurity Law, supra note 22, at art. 31. 
146 For example, the Outline of National Informatization Development Strategy aims 
to build core technologies “to create a leading, ‘secure and controllable’ core 
technology system.” USITO, STATE COUNCIL RELEASED AN OUTLINE OF THE 
NATIONAL INFORMATION DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (2016), 
http://www.usito.org/news/state-council-released-outline-national-informatization-
development-strategy. “China Manufacturing 2025 Plan” envisions domestically 
manufactured core components and key basic materials will reach 40 and 70 percent 




The legislation protects critical information infrastructure, particularly 
cyber-attack inspection. In 2017, China launched a nationwide 
inspection of key network infrastructures such as finance, energy, 
electric power, communication, and transportation for the first time. 
Policy foundations for this inspection can be found in the CSL. The 
CSL establishes a systematic responsibility framework for the national 
cyberspace administration, for the departments in charge of critical 
information infrastructure security protection, and for CII operators. 
The CSL imposes mandatory testing and certification of computer 
equipment. Specifically, Article 21 and Article 34 prescribe ten 
security protection obligations for the critical information 
infrastructure operators “to ensure that the network is free from 
interference, damage or unauthorized access, and prevent network data 
from being divulged, stolen or falsified.”147 Article 38 also compels 
CII operators to “conduct detection and assessment of their 
cybersecurity and potential risks [to] their own or entrust cybersecurity 
service institutions” and report the results of the assessment to relevant 
national departments at least once a year. 148  Additionally, other 
ancillary documents prescribe general network operators’ 
responsibility to the CII operators, including carrying out internal 
training and drills, formulating cyber incident response plans, monitor 
the cybersecurity status during daily operation, reporting to associated 
governmental departments when cybersecurity risks are found, and 
evaluating and classifying potential risks.149  
 
by 2020 and 2025, respectively. EUROPEAN UNION CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN 
CHINA. CHINA MANUFACTURING 2025: PUTTING INDUSTRIAL POLICY AHEAD OF 
MARKET FORCES 11 (2017).  
147 Cybersecurity Law, supra note 22, at art. 21 & art. 34. The ten security protection 
obligations are: 1) developing Internet security procedures and determining the 
persons of responsibility. 2) taking technical measures to prevent network attack, 3) 
taking technical measures to monitor and record network operation, 4) taking 
measures of categorization and encryption to protect data,5) performing other 
obligations as prescribed by laws and administrative regulation, 6) designating 
persons in charge of security management, 7) conduct cybersecurity education and 
technical training, 8) making disaster recovery backups of important databases, 9) 
making emergency responses for cybersecurity incidents. Id.  
148 Cybersecurity Law, supra note 22, at art. 38.  
149 Paul Triolo, Rogier Creemers & Graham Webster, China’s Ambitious Rules to 




Due to the significant responsibility of CII operators, network 
operators, especially those of multinational companies, expressed 
concerns about the scope of what constitutes critical information 
infrastructure. Further, the vagueness of the law leaves foreign 
companies in a disadvantaged position. Although the Draft Security 
Protection Measures for CII listed four criteria to be considered as CII 
operators, it still leaves the interpretation of the specific scope and 
precise constitution of critical infrastructure to the government’s 
discretion. 150  The broad definition of “critical information 
infrastructure operators” would seem to include major multinational 
corporations that have network infrastructure in China.151 
 
China is not the only country to express concerns about American 
hegemony on Internet infrastructure. Both democratic and non-
democratic countries, like Canada and Russia, have shown similar 
interests in pursuing self-designed core Internet infrastructure. For 
example, Canadian researchers suggested that “no regular internet user 
in Canada will be free from exposure to NSA surveillance” due to the 
lack of trans-Atlantic fiber optic cables.152 While democratic countries 
believably propose developing Internet infrastructure “to advance the 
 
Secure ‘Critical Information Infrastructure’, NEW AMERICA (July 14, 2017), 
https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/blog/chinas-ambitious-rules-
secure-critical-information-infrastructure/ [https://perma.cc/NU9J-5PT4]; Law-Now, 
China Publishes the Draft Security Protection Measures for Critical Information 
Infrastructure, CMS (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.cmslawnow.com/ealerts/2017/07 
/china-publishes-the-draft-security-protection-measures-for-critical-information-
infrastructure?cc_lang=en [https://perma.cc/CSV3-CR6F].  
150 Another Step Forward Filling in Blanks in the Cyber Security Law or More 




151 KPMG CHINA, OVERVIEW OF CHINA’S CYBERSECURITY LAW 5-6 (2017), 
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/cn/pdf/en/2017/02/overview-of -
cybersecurity-law.pdf. 
152 Andrew Clement, Canadian Network Sovereignty: A Strategy for Twenty-First-
Century National Infrastructure Building, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE 
INNOVATION (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.cigionline.org/articles/canadian-network-
sovereignty [https://perma.cc/TDD7-54PK]. 
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public interest,”153 China has worked to improve Internet infrastructure 
with the same purported end, making critics skeptical. Many critics 
worry that concrete physical infrastructure will fortify state 
surveillance and censorship mechanisms. 154  As such, this article 
presents two case studies to argue that, at the physical level, DNS 
Poisoning and the potential threat to the freedom of the other nations’ 
speech differentiates China from other nations.  
 
ii. DNS Cache Pollution 
 
DNS Poisoning occurs when a user attempts to retrieve the IP address 
from DNS servers, but encounters a blockage in forwarding the IP 
address to their computer. When their DNS is polluted, people cannot 
successfully open webpages. The Great Firewall (GFW) usually 
prevents domestic access to foreign websites, but has been found to 
cause collateral damage on an international scale. For example, in 
2010, all traffic passing through the Beijing-based I-Root DNS were 
exposed to the risk of being unable to access websites censored by 
China.155 For example, Facebook users in the U.S. might be censored if 
they used a Beijing node. Even though a Beijing node is not the closest 
node to U.S. Internet users, and thus unlikely, this scenario is not 
impossible due to the Internet’s routing design.156 Following this 
incident, research showed that approximately 26 percent of DNS 
resolvers across 109 countries were polluted.157 As a result, the Beijing 





153 Id. (“A national digital infrastructure strategy for Canada should be based on 
“network sovereignty” — the long-standing principle that to advance the public 
interest.”). 
154 Jon Fringas, China’s New Internet Backbone Explained: Verified Sources, IPv6 at 
the Core, ENGADGET (Nov. 3, 2013), https://www.engadget.com/2013/03/11/chinas-
new-internet-backbone-detailed-for-the-public/ [https://perma.cc/NB8W-XCH7]. 
155 Robert McMillan, China’s Great Firewall Spreads Overseas, COMPUTERWORLD 
(Mar. 25, 2010, 4:19 PM), https://www.computerworld.com/article/2516831/china-s-
great-firewall-spreads-overseas.html [https://perma.cc/84PB-NXWJ]. 
156 Earl Zmijewski, Accidentally Importing Censorship, DYNAMIC DNS (Mar. 30, 
2010), https://dyn.com/blog/fouling-the-global-nest/ [https://perma.cc/Y328-8NNV]. 
157 Anonymous, The Collateral Damage of Internet Censorship by DNS Injection, 42 
ACM SIGCOMM COMPUTER COMM. 22, 26-7 (2012).  
158 Root Sever Plugs China Firewall Leak, IT PROPORTAL (Mar. 31, 2010), 
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Similar incidents occurred in 2014 and 2015.159  
 
Although the pollution has was seemingly unintentional,160 China’s 
unique firewall design still has the potential to generate impacts for 
other nations. Therefore, when China tries to improve Internet 
infrastructure for national security reasons like western countries, the 
legitimacy of “advancing the public interest” is compromised by the 
notorious censorship mechanism and its potential to spread censorship 
overseas. 
 
At the physical level, publicizing the concept of cyber sovereignty 
allows China to introduce the importance of technological 
independence to network security regardless of the character of the 
state, further advancing its pursuit of technological development at the 
physical layer. This affords China some legitimacy to explore its 
Internet physical infrastructure. For example, in January 2018, China 
Unicom developed the world’s first mimic DNS server. China initiated 
this project in hopes to, per the head of technicians, “effectively 
prevent various known and unknown attacks.”161 Although China 




159 Paul Mozur, China Websites Hit with Disruptions, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 21, 
2014, 9:40 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/01/21/chinas-sina-baidu-and-
other-big-websites-are-hit-with-disruptions/ [https://perma.cc/5ZC4-PFYK]; Zāo 
DNS tóu dú DDoS gōngjí de fúwùqì píngbì zhōngguó IP (遭 DNS投毒 DDoS攻击
的服务器屏蔽中国 IP) [DDOS Attacked by DNS Server Blocks Chinese IP], CHINA 
DIGITAL TIMES (Jan. 23, 2015), https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/2015 
[https://perma.cc/W23P-E6SG]. 
160 Jaikumar Vijayan, China Internet Rerouting Likely Accidentals, Says Security 
Firm, COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 19, 2010, 3:15 PM), 
https://www.computerworld.com/article/2514686/china-internet-rerouting-likely-
accidental--says-security-firm.html [https://perma.cc/S88A-HGTB]. 
161 Yamei, World’s First mMimic DNS Server Operates in China, XINHUA NET (Jan. 
24, 2018, 1:18 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/24/c_136920666.ht 
m [https://perma.cc/76NR-P9TL]. Wu Jiangxing, a Chinese Academy of Engineering 
academician and head of the research team said, “[M]imic DNS server is just our 
first application. The mimic web server, mimic cloud, mimic data center and other 
network devices will be launched in the future.” Id.  
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international community has legitimate concerns regarding the Great 
Firewall’s design.   
 
iii. Beyond Investing in Internet Infrastructure 
 
In 2017, at the opening ceremony of the first Belt and Road 
International Forum, President Xi announced a digital Silk Road plan 
as a subset of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to 
intensify global cooperation in areas of digital economy and artificial 
intelligence.162 Over the past two years, China has sent national 
technology champions to bring advanced IT infrastructure to BRI 
partner countries, embarking on an estimated $200 billion investment 
in projects around developing countries who are looking to modernize 
their Internet infrastructure.163  
 
Alongside a wide range of gear and relatively cheap materials, 
observers pointed out that China also offers information systems, 
censorship training, and model laws for surveillance.164  Freedom 
House describes how since January 2017, Chinese tech giants have 
built fiber-optic Internet infrastructure and networks in 38 countries 
and installed AI surveillance programs in 18 countries.165 These 
programs will improve the infrastructure base and promote the 
economic growth of China’s BRI partner nations; but, these programs 
also have the potential to insert backdoor mechanisms that could 
support propaganda and surveillance activities as well. These concerns 





162 Huang Yong, Construction of Digital Silk Road Lights Up BRI Cooperation, 
PEOPLE’S DAILY (April 24, 2019, 9:42 A.M.), http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0424/ 
c90000-9571418.html [https://perma.cc/A9YE-X98J]. 
163 Russell Deeks, The Digital Silk Road- China’s $200 Billion Project, SCI. FOCUS 
(Dec. 8, 2018, 6:00 P.M.), https://www.sciencefocus.com/future-technology/the-
digital-silk-road-chinas-200-billion-project/ [https://perma.cc/A2EA-ZMYG]. 
164 Sally Adee, The Global Internet is Disintegrating. What Comes Next?, BBC 
FUTURE (May 14, 2019, 6:00 PM), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20190514-the-
global-internet-is-disintegrating-what-comes-next [https://perma.cc/YT2P-L639]. 
165 Emily Dreyfuss, The Internet Became Less Free in 2018. Can we Fight Back?, 
WIRED (Dec. 26, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/internet-freedom-
china-2018/ [https://perma.cc/6LRN-2LNX]. 
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pursuing surveillance. For example, as Tanzanian Deputy Minister for 
Communications Edwin Ngonyani states, “[i]n America, where most 
of these platforms originate, they often say freedom must be unlimited, 
but in our case we must find ways to make sure that while a person is 
free to say anything there are mechanisms to hold them accountable 
for what they say.”166 According to Samm Sacks in The Atlantic, 
Chinese influence helped Tanzania pass a cybercrime law which 
resembles the Chinese version.167 In addition, even if some countries 
are reluctant to adopt censorship tactics, critics argue that Beijing 
would be able to leverage economic debts to force countries to censor 
their Internet.168 Overall, despite the fact that the Chinese officials 
denied any intention to spread censorship, 169  critics warned that 
China’s control of digital infrastructure projects might require, or at 
minimum, affect another country’s intention to cordon off its social 
networks.  
 
Other discussions also appear in the literature regarding China’s strict 
regulation at the physical layer, but some are not worth serious 
attention. For example, in his book, Mueller spent many words 
discussing how a proposal entitled “DNS Extension for Autonomous 
Internet (AIP),” which was written by three Chinese engineers, will 
transform the global Internet into a series of national intranets by 
creating independent domain name hierarchies and root DNS 
servers.170 While this proposal seems to conform to the state-centric 
multilateral agenda, this proposal is never mentioned by the official 





166 Asteruius Banzi, Tanzania: Govt Seeks Chinese Help in Social Media, 
ALLAFRICA (Aug. 1, 2017), https://allafrica.com/stories/201708020658.html 
[https://perma.cc/FE95-WVY2]. 
167 Samm Sacks, Beijing Wants to Rewrite the Rules of the Internet, ATLANTIC (June 
18, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/zte-huawei-
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169 James Griffiths, China is Exporting the Great Firewall as Internet Freedom 
Declines Around the World, CNN (Nov. 2, 2018, 2:34 A.M.), 
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scholars.171 Unrepresentative voices need to be distinguished in order 
to understand China’s cyber strategy at the physical layer.  
 
b. A Multilateral Approach to Cyber Sovereignty 
 
To be on the Internet, the first requirement is to have an Internet 
Protocol (IP) number. Root servers, or name servers, are responsible 
for translating an IP address into a name. Root servers are easier to 
remember, such as Google.com. The root authority, also called 
Internet Naming and Numbering Authority, is a central authority for 
assigning IP numbers and administering root domains. The Domain 
Name System (DNS) and the allocation of IP numbers, then, are of 
crucial importance for operations at the logical layer. Goldsmith and 
Wu suggested that the Internet’s future rests on the DNS, a “global law 
without which there would be no Internet.” 172  The hierarchical 
structure of the DNS made it a centralized one as there must only be a 
single root for the hierarchical name space.173 The ownership of this 
single root is of critical importance as it has the power to decide 
whether to allocate a name within a given domain namespace,174 
affects valuable Internet-related property rights,175 and has particular 
political and national security importance.176 The root authority is 
currently controlled by a private corporation: the Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which also happens to 
have a contractual obligation to the U.S. Department of Commerce.  
 
In contrast to ICANN’s proposition for restricting participation by 
national governments, and instead of engaging the participation of 
social sectors, China has been actively advocating for a multilateral 





171 As of June 2019, only three citations of the Chinese version of this proposal could 
be found.  
172 GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 3, at 168. 
173 Id. at 194.  
174 MARTIN CLARK, DATA NETWORKS, IP AND THE INTERNET: PROTOCOLS, DESIGN 
AND OPERATION 456 (2003).  
175 GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 3, at 31.  
176 LAURA DENARDIS, PROTOCOL POLITICS: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTERNET 
GOVERNANCE 194 (2009).  
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participation i. In short, China is pushing for a government-driven 
model of Internet governance. This article, then, argues that China has 
a strong motivation to challenge the ICANN model by pushing for a 
government-driven multilateral model in the global Internet 
governance landscape. To do so, this article outlines the evolution of 
the multilateral model, and articulates how cyber sovereignty 
contributes to the promotion of multilateralism. 
 
i. The Rise of a Multilateral Internet Governance 
Model 
 
As Internet development progressed, disputes arose on how to regulate 
the logical layer, resulting in two rival cyber-diplomacy regulatory 
schemes. The U.S. and its Western allies embrace the multi-
stakeholder model, which emphasizes engaging a wide range of 
participation from multiple sectors, especially from the private 
sector.177 Participation by national governments in ICANN is restricted 
and government officials are prohibited from serving on the corporate 
board of directors.178 Other countries and world powers, such as Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), increasingly express a 
restive attitude towards America’s dominance of such a vital and 
centralized organization for regulating the Internet.179 They subscribe 
to the multilateralism model, which asserts that countries should 
establish a non-intervention policy regarding cyber regulation.  
 
The late emergence of the multilateral camp was an anti-monopolistic 
reaction to the existing multi-stakeholder model. Multi-stakeholderism 
follows the principles of “seeking the private sector’s participation in 
Internet governance,” and committing to “advocate for inclusiveness 
in fora that take up such issues.”180 As Lawrence E. Strickling, U.S. 
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Information, said, “the steadfast policy of the U.S. government has 
been to promote these values of inclusion and participation through 
our support for the multistakeholder process.”181 However, developing 
countries complained that the inclusiveness Strickling proudly 
underlines seems to only include dominant ICT carriers and other non-
state sectors. These actors are usually composed of U.S. actors and 
cater to U.S. interests.182 Important non-governmental participants and 
decision-makers within ICANN were predominantly American during 
the cyber-utopian age. Further, globally competitive private sector 
actors certainly do not favor most of the developing countries, which 
comprise the majority of the multilateral camp. In this case, the 
multilateralists worry that the Internet would be controlled by strong 
business operators like Alibaba and Apple, leaving the development of 
Internet standards in transport, routing and security, and managing the 
TCP/IP protocol in the hands of American-dominated non-
governmental sectors like the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).  
 
The multilateralists also criticize interferences from the U.S. 
Government, because America openly and repeatedly discourages 
governmental participation even while representing multi-
stakeholderism. This criticism dates back to the birth of ICANN, 
which has legally remained under contract with the U.S. Commerce 
Department. Milton Mueller pointed out that, as much as ICANN’s 
managers and its supporters in business and the U.S. government 
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nongovernmental voices that the model amplifies, including technology companies 
and nongovernmental actors, have ties to the United States or share its values.”); 
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exclusively beholden to a single sovereign, the U.S. government.183 He 
questions the decentralization feature of ICANN, which symbolizes 
the current multi-stakeholderism system, and describes the government 
intervention from the U.S. as “a new form of centralized control over 
the Internet and a sharp departure from the earlier Internet’s freer, self-
governing, and technically neutral administration.” 184  Wu and 
Goldsmith also questioned the sincerity of the U.S. government’s 
discussion about “bottom up governance” and “the Internet 
community.”185 They suggested that the U.S., “never actually ceded 
control or either ICANN or the root” and “the physical root, the 
computer containing the root zone file, remained under the ownership 
of the United States.” 186  Ben Wagner emphasized this towards 
ICANN, arguing that the primary functions of institutions such as 
ICANN and the vaunted concept of multi-stakeholderism, are meant to 
provide “symbolic legitimacy theatre” to the overall Internet 
governance regime and prevent new Internet regulatory institutions 
from being created.187 
 
Entering 2010, the multilateral model became increasingly popular in 
the Global South, and a strong competitor to replace the multi-
stakeholder model. Multilateralism has, however, been criticized for 
restraining freedom of expression and top-down control over the 
regulation of the DNS.188 These two criticisms were rooted in its state-
driven regulatory mechanism: the multilateral model is a traditional 
governance mechanism whereby governments come together to 
discuss the coordination of international telecommunications issues. 
The next section will explore how China exemplified this model and 
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LEGITIMACY IN GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE 157-74 (2016).  
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2020] WANG 447 
 
 
ii. Aligning Cyber Sovereignty With 
Multilateralism 
 
The multilateral countries made continuing efforts to propel the 
transfer of the root authority from ICANN to traditional UN-driven 
bodies, such as the ITU or the UN Committee on Internet-Related 
Policy (CIRP), under the belief that the Internet should be governed 
the same way as other media, like broadcasting and telecommunication 
tools. Under the multilateral model, the regulatory organization 
“functions firmly in the hands of the governments in the committee” 
with advisory groups from technical, business, civil society, and 
international organization sectors that would “advise and assist” 
them.189 This compares to the ICANN model, which gives more weight 
to civil society and business groups for policy design and has 
governments perform the advisory role.190  
 
As a country which views itself as one of the most important forces on 
the global stage, China not only strictly controls cyberspace 
domestically, but also strives to incorporate its understanding of cyber 
sovereignty into the international system. Binxing Fang, the main 
architect of the Great Fire Wall project, pointed out that the first of the 
major objectives for which to advocate cyber sovereignty 
internationally is to contribute to or enhance China’s leading position 
in international law. 191 
 
China is a firm advocate for the multilateral model on the international 
stage. It utilizes cyber sovereignty as a kind of diplomatic language to 
promote the multilateralist cyber strategy of having state sovereigns 
control cyberspace, rather than a mixture of non-state actors. There are 
two explanations for this strategy. First, although Chinese academic 
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days, they did not partake in cyber-utopianism, nor did they have self-
governed technical communities to independently run the Internet. The 
open character of the Internet may liberate information exchange and 
mobilize social resistance in many cases,192 but it is still far from the 
anarchist spirit of cyber-utopianism. As China never implemented the 
anarchical social value sometimes seen in the Internet, non-
governmental forces that enable the operation of multi-stakeholderism 
are weak. Second, unlike John Parlow, the Chinese government 
fundamentally does not see excluding government regulation as 
relevant to building a humane and fair world.193 Cyber sovereigntists 
do not recognize universal values; they believe that the “humane and 
fair world,”194 includes respecting other states’ will to freely choose 
whether to censor online harmful speech, to control Internet insecurity, 
and to regulate. It is not a declaration of the independence of the 
Internet, but a declaration of how the elite tried to impose a liberal 
imagination on other states.  
 
Unsurprisingly, China is not the only country that espouses the 
multilateral model. Since the founding of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization in 2009, China has forged a close partnership with 
Russia in promoting the state-driven internet governance model. They 
have successfully lobbied for the inclusion of the term “multilateral” 
into documents at WSIS,195 regularly held international fora,196 and 
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central themes of “non-intervention” and “equal government 
participation” were repeatedly emphasized in their cooperation. For 
instance, in the “International Code of Conduct for Information 
Security” that China, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan submitted to 
the UN General Assembly in September 2011, states are required “to 
reaffirm all States’ rights and responsibilities to protect, in accordance 
with relevant laws and regulations, their information space and critical 
information infrastructure from threats, disturbance, attack and 
sabotage.” 198  In another joint statement published in 2016, they 
reached consensus in “jointly advocating respect to and opposing 
infringements on every country's sovereignty in information space” 
and “resist[ing] the interference via information space in other 
countries' internal affairs, disruption of social order, incitement of 
inter-ethnic, inter-racial and inter-religious antagonism, and 
undermining national governance.”199 Their stances and cooperation 
are bound to face backlash from multi-stakeholders.  
 
A major criticism leveled by Western countries, and by the United 
States in particular, is that the multilateral entities fail to include non-
state perspectives, especially those from the private sector. Assistant 
Secretary Strickling expressed this reservation in relation to the 
Washington Council on International Trade (WCIT) process in 2012, 
noting that, “[o]nly member states will have a vote at the ITU. A treaty 
conference, such as the WCIT, can never be a true multistakeholder 
process where all interests are fairly represented.”200 Phil Verveer, the 
deputy assistant secretary for the Obama State Department, echoed this 
concern by explaining that “[g]overnmental proposals to expand the 
ITR’s to include centralized control over the Internet through a top-
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than innovators and experts, in charge of the future of the Internet.”201 
The common wisdom that the Internet is an open place with minimum 
governmental participation that cyber-utopianists left for the world 
also underlines this criticism. The early cyber-utopianists have left a 
legacy of social consciousness that embedded a free and open 
character within discussion of the Internet, despite the fact that the 
self-governance plan did not survive its encounter with the U.S. 
government. This social consciousness later became an intangible yet 
important asset to the persistent belief in multi-stakeholderism, which 
openly encourages the participation of non-governmental sectors. 
 
Additionally, the United States and its Western allies worried that 
China would utilize the language of Internet freedom and sovereignty 
to justify their own surveillance activities and suppression of free 
speech. They see installing the concept “equal role,” in terms of 
governmental responsibility, as a precursor to regulating content and 
weakening the dominating position of civil society and Western-
influenced groups in executing Internet policy.202 In an interview with 
the New Yorker, Prof. Tim Wu characterized China’s Internet 
sovereignty as “a statement of private international law as typically 
practiced,” suggesting that “the big difference is that other countries . . 
. have a certain respect for the network as a platform for free speech . . 
. [B]ut China is unique in its lack of respect for the idea of an open 
Internet.”203 
 
c. China’s Domestic Practices 
 
As China pushes for a greater role for governments in regulating the 
Internet internationally, it has also been preparing itself to take on such 
responsibility by experimenting with self-designed architectures 
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made to prevent future cyber-attacks.  
 
The deployment of the Internet Protocol version 6-based network 
(IPv6, CNGI-CERNET2) reflected China’s ambition to become the 
leading player in the creation of the next generation of the Internet. 
China was in a poor position relative to the U.S. at the IP level, due to 
an address shortage under the current IPv4 system. As such, China 
published a national plan to boost the Internet development industry, 
aiming to collect 200 million active users of IPv6 by the end of 2018, 
with the number set to exceed 500 million by 2020.204 Compared to the 
original design of IPv4, which left security out of its design, IPv6 
supports end-to-end encryption and is more secure. It is more difficult 
to attack domain name parsing—which will advance the security of 
communications between the DNS and IP addresses.  
 
Cyber sovereignty corresponds to the aforementioned cybersecurity 
concern through the development of sovereign Internet architecture. 
China has monitored massive cyber-attack incidents in the logical 
layer, such as malwares, hardware vulnerabilities and content linked to 
“malicious” IP addresses.205 The number of attacks has increased, 
ranging from National Top-Level Domain Name (gTLD) to operations 
of content delivery network (CDN). However, this legal protection 
generated international controversies. The draft of “New Domain 
Name Rules,” included Article 37, stipulates that any foreign domain 
name whose website is hosted in China must be registered with a 





204 Tuījìn hùliánwǎng xiéyì dì liù bǎn (IPv6) guīmó bùshǔ xíngdòng jìhuà (推进互联
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could result in inaccessibility for mainland users. In response, 
American Ambassador Daniel Sepulveda and his colleagues published 
a joint statement, describing this proposal as “forced 
localization” which would “potentially create new barriers to the free 
flow of information and commerce across borders and consequently 
infringe upon internationally recognized commitments on free 
expression and trade.”207 In the end, Article 37 was deleted when the 
law was formally enforced.  
 
d. Content Regulation with Chinese Characteristics 
 
Content-layer regulation occupies a central place in China’s multi-
layered regulatory system. Before the establishment of the CAC, 
Adam Segal observed that Chinese policymakers, like their Russian 
counterparts, are more prone to emphasizing “information security” as 
opposed to America, which understands cyber sovereignty as being 
more about infrastructure-based security.208 Information security, or 
Information sovereignty, implements regulatory scrutiny of the spread 
of information.209 Gong Wenxiang described how the concept of 
information sovereignty began to percolate around 2005, and a 
majority of Chinese literature proposed information sovereignty as 
allowing China to resist cultural hegemony and information 
colonialism. After the CAC launched, content regulation is still the 
forefront area of these three layers: as of June 2017, the majority of 
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i. Censorship and Content Regulation 
 
“Online positive publicity must become bigger and stronger, so that 
the Party's ideas always become the strongest voice in cyberspace.” 
-Synthesizing Xi’s Cyber Strategic Thinking on Cyberspace, 
Qiushi211  
 
This Section will analyze China’s regulation at the content layer by 
probing into censorship and introducing the interview mechanism for 
content management since the age of Internet of Things. Although 
Internet governance has become a pervasive phenomenon, what makes 
China distinctive is that corresponding laws do not only apply to 
physical infrastructure located within Chinese territory. Additionally, 
they include censorship at the content layer that does not share 
physical exclusivity and fails to meet the criterion of “territorial 
localization” utilized in common wisdom. 
 
Before the birth of the CAC, a large variety of Ministries incorporated 
supervising online publications into their general responsibilities, in 
addition to overseeing traditional fields of publication.212 However, 
despite the fact that these Ministries published the early legal 
documents for online content regulation, the State Council Information 
Office and the Central Propaganda Department remain the top 
decision-making authority for establishing laws and policies . Stepping 
into the age of Internet of Things, public opinion through online 
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ideological work” in the eye of General Secretary Xi.213 In 2014, the 
Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) was officially authorized 
to be responsible for monitoring and regulating online content 
publication.214  
 
The legal basis for censorship can be found in many laws with similar 
wording, but Article 15 of the “Regulation on Internet Information 
Service” Law shows a suitable origin of the definition, with nine 
scenarios for categorizing which contents “conforms to the law” and 
which should be censored.215 As these nine rules established the 
bottom line for censorship in the content layer, other recent 
departmental rules adopted them in essentially the same way with 
different wordings.216 While these rules may seem too broad to be 
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by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Aug. 24, 2017, effective 
Nov. 1, 2017), at art. 28 [hereinafter Measures]; (互联网视听节目服务管理规定) 
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People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate in 2013 
provides some reference.217  
 
These nine criteria for content censorship reflect China’s pursuit of 
national and ideological security. At the national level, most censored 
content addresses the maintenance of public order. China views 
maintaining social order as the necessary foundation for economic 
growth, which provides the government with its legitimacy. While 
democratic countries usually view terrorism as a threat to national 
security, the Chinese government goes beyond terrorists and includes 
content that could elicit collective actions as national threats.218 Guided 
by a goal of maintaining social order, it represses online information 
that has the potential to trigger offline collective actions, including 
even ones that praise the government.219 At the ideological security 
level, China censors content detrimental to its international image and 
deems maintaining “a clear cyberspace” as a valuable source of 
national political security. Ideological thinking that conflicts with 
socialist values, which sometimes included Western democratic 
values, are deemed errant and are not welcomed. With regard to 
“online rumors, violent video, and other harmful information” that 
damage the clear cyberspace, the Theoretical Studies Center Group of 
CAC published accordingly in Qiushi;  
 
We must . . . steadily control all kinds of major public opinion; 
dare to grasp, dare to control, and dare to wield the bright sword; 
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incidents and public opinion from becoming online ideological 
patterns and issues.220 
 
To clean up these “erroneous ideas,” China designed an extensive and 
technologically sophisticated mechanism of Internet censorship. It 
demonstrates its ambition and capability for governmental control over 
Internet communications by featuring explicit techniques such as a 
keyword filtering mechanism, the enforcement of the Real-Name 
Registration policy, blocking individuals’ access to virtual private 
networks (VPNs), and implicit techniques such as using algorithms to 
divert search results. 
 
It is important to point out the three layers do not operate 
independently of each other. In the age of the Internet of Things, China 
has started to incorporate standards designed for regulating the 
physical layer and logical layer to influence the content layer. Scholars 
have identified the content layer as the layer most susceptible to the 
strict control of higher layers, but not vice-versa.221 In other words, 
squeezing the physical layer or the logical layer will stymie innovation 
on the content layer, but strict control of the content layer alone hardly 
has any influence on the basic physical or logical layers. China’s 
legislation reflects this point.  
 
The Cybersecurity Law (CSL) demonstrates China’s pursuit of data 
localization at the content layer through regulating critical 
infrastructure at the physical layer. Article 37 of the CSL sets the legal 
basis for the data localization rule and is perhaps the most 
controversial rule of the CSL. The rule requires full access to stored 
data within the critical information infrastructure and a security 
assessment of the data or approval from relevant regulators is 
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which is arguably the broadest scope of data localization in the world, 
some observers evaluate Article 37 as stressing the importance of 
protecting the critical infrastructure of major communication industries 
and setting the foundation for enforcing penalties on organizations and 
individuals who break into the nation’s critical infrastructure.223 On the 
other hand, critics have argued that the CSL will “have significant 
operational and business implications for domestic and international 
network operators, as well as for suppliers of network products and 
services.”224 International observers also worry that the CSL allows the 
theft of foreign clients’ data and hampers the development of 
innovative capabilities. 225  Lance Noble, the Policy and 
Communications Manager of the European Union Chamber of 
Commerce in China, warned that uncertainty surrounding the law 
could make foreign technology firms reluctant to bring their best 
innovations to China.226 Researchers have shown that data localization 
has an economic disadvantage with a negative correlation between 
data localization and national GDP and investment.227  
 
China refined and republished the “Measures for the Administration of 
Internet Domain Names” in 2017.228 Article 28 lays out the criterion of 
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Internet content restriction as other previous versions. However, 
compared to the previous versions published in 2002229 and 2004,230 
which it replaced, this version added a new rule in addition to the nine 
scenarios, stating “[n]o domain name registry or domain name 
registrar may provide services for domain names that contain contents 
as listed in the preceding paragraph.”231 Article 38 reinforces content 
control by stipulating that “no domain name skip may be provided for 
a domain name that contains the contents as listed in paragraph 1 of 
Article 28 of these Measures.”232 Violators can be charged with a fine 
of not less than 10,000 yuan nor more than 30,000 yuan.233 This legal 
modification illustrates the constraints imposed on domain name 
service providers: they are no longer only responsible for the content 
they manufacture, but are now also required to oversee the content 
manufactured by others who use their services. This extension of 
responsibility on the logical layer therefore allows China to deepen its 
control over online content.  
 
Although China placed heavy responsibilities on providers of all sorts, 
the intervention is a rather complicated task for the platform providers. 
Intervening in the spread of content which will break the law is a basic 
requirement. However, they do not only need to intervene; they must 
also ensure their intervention is on the right track. Published in 2017, a 
notice regarding Internet comments postings includes the Article 7, 
which explains that the provider “shall not interfere with public 
opinions by selectively deleting or recommending comments, among 
others, for seeking illicit interests based on erroneous value 
 
Names” in 2017], 
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orientation.”234 To be accurate, selective deletion or recommending 
comments is encouraged, especially for contents which “violate the 
law,” is contrary to the “correct orientation,” or sabotages “active and 
healthy network cultures.” 235  Whether such selective deletion or 
recommendation is lawful is contingent upon whether the value 
orientation is “erroneous.” Similar emphasis on the “correct 
orientation” is repeatedly included in other “normative documents” 
published by the CAC, ranging from regulations in response to self-
publishing microbloggers 236  and video-makers 237  to professional 
WeChat subscribed articles.238 Because of the blurry definition of the 
“erroneous” idea and difficulties of compliance, the CAC sometimes 
steps in to supervise service providers when they do not fulfill their 
censorship mandates. In the next section, this article will discuss the 
CAC supervision system with an administrative design called “the 
interview.”  
  
ii. The Interview Mechanism 
 
In 2015, the CAC released a normative document which describes the 
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235 Id. (promulgated by the Cyberspace Administration of China, Aug. 23, 2017, 
effective Oct. 1, 2017), at art. 4.  
236 (微博客信息服务管理规定) [Provisions on the Administration of Microblog 
Information Services] (promulgated by the Cyberspace Administration of China, 
Feb. 2, 2018), at art. 5.  
237 (互联网直播服务管理规定) [Provisions on the Administration of Internet Live-
Streaming Services] (promulgated by the State Internet Information Office, Nov. 4, 
2016), at art. 3.  
238 (互联网用户公众账号信息服务管理规定) [Provisions on the Administration of 
Internet User Public Account Information Services] (promulgated by the Cyberspace 
Administration of China on Sep. 7, 2017), at art. 4.  
239 (互联网新闻信息服务单位约谈工作规定) [Provisions on the Interview of 
Entities Providing Internet News Information Services] (promulgated by the State 
Internet Information Office on Apr. 28, 2015), at art. 4 (hereinafter Provisions). 
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Information Office to set up interviews with “entities providing 
internet news information services” who commit “a serious violation 
of the law or regulation.”240 This is done in order to “promote internet 
operation in accordance with the law and internet operation in a 
civilized manner” and to “create a clean online environment.”241 By 
giving warnings during the dialectic interview, the CAC encourages 
compliance and cooperation by business entities, and voluntary 
modification or deletion of illegal contents. The CSL establishes the 
legal basis for participants in the interview, stating that “the network 
operator shall take measures to make rectification and eliminate 
hidden risks as required.”242 After its implementation, giving alerts and 
ordering rectifications has become the most commonly practiced 
technique the CAC employs.  
 
The CAC and its local office “interviewed” over 2000 websites in 
2017, a few hundred more than the totals in 2015 and 2016 combined. 
Popular websites include the news aggregation websites, like UC 
Toutiao, Jinri Toutiao, news publishing websites, such as Fenghuang 
Website, Xinlang, Souhu, Wangyi, and self-publishing websites Kwai, 
Zhihu, and TikTok. Common reasons that trigger interviews include 
hosting content involving fake news, insulting communist martyrs, 
excessive self-promotion by commercial stars from the entertainment 
industry, and content against the rules.243 Three of nine scenarios that 
will elicit the interview mechanism directly address the content 
layer,244 including 1) the entity seeks unlawful interests by gathering, 
editing, publishing, reprinting or deleting news information; 2) the 
entity fails to deal with illegal information in a timely manner and the 
circumstances are serious; or 3) the entity fails to establish a sound 





240 Provisions, supra note 228, at art. 2.  
241 Provisions, supra note 228, at art. 1.  
242 Cybersecurity Law, supra note 74, at art. 56.  
243 北京网信办整治自媒体平台,约谈腾讯凤凰今日头条等 (CAC Beijing office 
rectified self-publishing platforms and interviewed Tencent, ifeng, and jinritoutiao), 
CZTV (July 19, 2017, 8:27 P.M.) http://n.cztv.com/news/12606676.html 
[https://perma.cc/F8CQ-26NG]. 
244 Provisions, supra note 228 at art. 4.  
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implement such a system. Furthermore, deciding what to censor on a 
local level to a certain degree also reflects the will of the Propaganda 
Department, because in practice, most of the local offices do not 
operate as an independent CAC office; they are integrated into the 
provincial Propaganda Department.  
 
The interview technique can be understood pursuant to the regulatory 
pyramid of Ayres and Braithwaite's responsive regulation theory.245 
This theory envisages a hierarchy of sanctions. When the state 
authority notices enterprises which conduct their business activities in 
a way which will cause infringement of the law, they first use 
persuasive measures like negotiation and conciliation to encourage 
cooperation and compliance. If negotiation does not work, then the 
authority will escalate their response to administrative sanctions and 
financial penalties. Criminal prosecution is the last resort which is only 
applied when every other choice of remedy is exhausted. Professor Lu 
reasoned that CAC’s interview mechanism resembles the hierarchical 
regulation model in terms of this escalating approach.246 Article 7 of 
“the Provision” mandates several punishment measurements: “a 
warning, a fine, an order to suspend business for rectification, 
revocation of a permit” and “a severer [sic] punishment” if an illegal 
act continues after multiple interviews. However, the interview 
mechanism slightly digresses from this pyramid: the degree of 
punishment usually, but not always escalates from warning to “the 
severer [sic] punishment.” The severity of the violation and the 
economic impact of the company also have to be factored in when 
deciding which level of punishment to start. For example, leading live 
social media streaming platform TikTok was ordered to delete content 





245 Lu Chao (卢超), Hulianwang Xinxi Neirong Jianguan Yuetan Gongju Yanjiu (互
联网信息内容监管约谈工具研究) [A study on the interview mechanism regarding 
content regulation] 2 CHINESE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (中国行政管理) (2019). 
246 Id.  
247 Jiawei Xu & Ji Bian, Douyin Advertisement Suspended for Releasing Defamatory 
Information of Chinese War Hero, PEOPLE’S DAILY (July 2, 2018, 1:41 PM), 
http://en.people.cn/n3/2018/0702/c90000-9476754.html [https://perma.cc/7K56-
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(approximately 140,000 USD). 248  However, Rage Comics was 
summarily shut down for the same reason.249  
The purpose of setting up interviews is not simply warning and 
punishing those platforms that serve illegal content in a case-by-case 
manner. To do this would elicit an endless Tom and Jerry game. 
Instead, Tom tries to catch Jerry by developing a self-regulating 
system in the interview mechanism: the CAC tries to dominate the 
platforms by instructing them on which content should be deleted, 
which ideally eventually launches a self-censoring mechanism within 
the company. For example, Kwai and Toutiao hired thousands of new 
employees to scrutinize illegal content after the interview.250 However, 
self-censorship may trigger an enhanced version of censorship. 
Because the interview is recorded and included in the routine 
assessment and annual inspection files,251 the news agencies and 
platforms are incentivized to avoid being summoned by the CAC, 
which provide motivation for the platforms to apply a stricter scope of 
self-censorship. Additionally, it is worth noting that the “modification” 
does not only mean deleting content deemed as violating the law - the 
Internet service providers are also required to add content with the 
“correct orientation” after the interview. For instance, on one of the 
many occasions Weibo was interviewed in 2018, its “trending topics” 
feature ("re’sou") was temporarily halted for a week as the CAC found 
it overly publicized some of the television stars who would pay to 
increase their exposure on its trending column.252 A week later, the 
 
HE72].  
248 She Ying(佘颖), 抖音的教训不应只是百万元罚款 (The lesson Tiktok should be 
learning should include things more than millions in fines), PEOPLE’S DAILY (Nov. 
19, 2018, 8:25 AM), http://it.people.com.cn/n1/2018/1119/c1009-30407699.html 
[https://perma.cc/UMT5-BWM4]. 
249 Manya Koetse, China’s Online ‘Baoman’ Community Shut Down: Behind Rage 
Comics, WHAT’S ON WEIBO (May 20, 2018), 
https://www.whatsonweibo.com/chinas-online-baoman-community-shut-down-
behind-the-rage-comics-baozou-manhua-craze/ [https://perma.cc/AU4G-XZ83]. 
250 Emma Lee, Kuaishou is Hiring More People to Filter Content after Crackdown 
on “Vulgar” Content, TECHNODE (April 8, 2018),  
https://technode.com/2018/04/08/kuaishou-content-patrols/ [https://perma.cc/5V6P-
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users rejoiced upon the reintegration of the trending function, but 
surprisingly found the launch of a brand-new column called “New 
Era” ("xin’shidai").253 “New Era” mainly promotes content praising 
socialist values and exhibits national achievements.254 
 
Issuing remedies that start with warnings rather than punitive 
measurements avoids inefficiencies of administrative cooperation 
within the bureaucracy. Although other departments also conduct 
interviews, the CAC plays a major role in the first step of the 
hierarchical regulation model. Their influence was weakened with 
increasingly severe punishments at the upper level, as the escalating 
measures involve a more complicated collection of governmental 
participators. For example, Article 42 of the “Provisions on the 
Administrative Law Enforcement Procedures for Internet Information 
Content Management” assigned telecommunications departments to 
“close the website, revoke the license for the value-added 
telecommunications business of Internet information services, or 
cancel its recordation.” 255  Therefore, the CAC could avoid the 
interview and warning steps, and instead directly follow the relevant 
provisions for punitive measures against errant operators who had 
committed “serious violation of the law.” Allowing a certain degree of 
flexibility actually empowers the CAC and avoids regulatory conflicts 
with other departments.  
 
This interview mechanism at the content layer epitomizes China’s 
 
Facebook Accused of Censoring Egyptian Activists, Lyft Employees Could be Spying 
on Riders (Feb. 2, 2018) https://rankingdigitalrights.org/2018/02/02/china-
temporarily-shuts-down-weibo-services/ [https://perma.cc/2RUQ-SWHM]. 
253 Guanchazhe Website (观察者网), 微博热门区新增新时代频道，弘扬社会主义
核心价值观 [New Era Segment was launched in Weibo Trending Section to Promote 
Socialist Value] Sina Tech. (Feb. 1, 2018, 7:49 PM) http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2018-
02-01/doc-ifyrcsrw6512478.shtml [https://perma.cc/5BV8-PVH5]. 
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Law Enforcement Procedures for Internet Information Content Management] 
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cyber governance strategy: although China expresses an assertive 
attitude in censoring content it deems inappropriate, the primary goal 
is not to shut down every domestic Internet company found to violate 
the censorship rules, especially the most influential Internet content 
providers. As the Internet service providers strengthen their content 
censorship or change features of services after the interview, they are 
mostly exonerated from punitive measures that they should be 
imposed because of their previous “serious violation of the law or 
regulation” 256 . In other words, the interview mechanism allows 
Chinese Internet companies to violate regulations without penalties, 
which will bring further economic benefits. But nudging companies to 
self-modify does not compromise the domination of the strong central 
government; the Chinese central government still has an absolute say 
on what constitutes a “serious violation to the law,” whereas domestic 
Internet companies can only choose between either modifying their 
content, which will not trigger any punishment even after committing 
a “serious violation to the law,” or not modifying as required and 
risking not being able to operate their business in the Mainland 
anymore. The interview is not to investigate, nor is it meant to allow 
the service providers to negotiate for some room in the published 
content. It is essentially non-negotiable in nature, including “a 
warning, point out the problems, or issue an order of rectification or 
correction.” This presents a new challenge for weak and disadvantaged 
service providers in deciding where the red line is drawn, and thus 




The centralization of the CAC and the strict control imposed by the 
Cybersecurity Law—the hefty responsibilities imposed on the network 
providers to regulate the content at the content layer and to safeguard 
the network security at the physical layer - illustrates China’s ambition 
to take the Internet as the fifth sovereign. But as Hong Shen argued, it 
would not contribute to our understanding of China’s approach on 
Internet governance if we limit our understanding to a level that 
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drive to elevate governments and intergovernmental organizations as 
the sole governors of the global Internet.”257 To develop a cohesive 
understanding of China’s Internet sovereignty, we need to investigate 
the whole picture: while the Chinese government is a firm supporter of 
a strong nation-state approach, Internet governance dynamics are also 
shaped by multiple participants including local state agencies, business 
units, industry cultural norms and institutional forces. 258  Their 
participation might not be as salient as the ICANN model in which 
each member is entitled to a vote, but it is inadequate to see their role 
as a static and purely subordinate state. In short, we should see not 
only the centralizing feature of the CAC, but also, and more 
importantly, the inside mechanism of the governmental agencies. This 
allows us to see how inefficient cooperation among state agencies 
impacted centralization, and recognize how the CAC makes 
compromises during the interviews with Chinese business units. 
 
Invisible participation that comes from multiple cooperating players 
benefits from China’s move to capitalize the Internet. By reviewing 
the historical emergence of the Internet in China, it becomes clear that 
one distinguishing factor of the Chinese interpretation of cyber 
sovereignty was its original intention for the Internet development: 
building an advanced economy. Unlike the United States, which 
championed the Internet’s ability to spread knowledge without 
borders, the main role China assigned to the Internet was to impel 
economic development. China never had Internet founding fathers 
who fought for the independent Internet spirit, nor believed in its 
decentralizing ability to reject dominant theories of system design, like 
the western pioneers once did. The Chinese soil for the Internet to 
grow was the economic development and ICT infrastructure building 
plans. It served as a governmental tool to boost the economy since day 
one and is still expected to advance the national economy in the 
present, despite a more complicated Internet environment. Because of 
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modify their illegal activities without punitive measures during the 
interviews. 
 
Content regulation at the content layer embodies an assertive nation-
state stance as the other factor which contributes to China’s unique 
interpretation of cyber sovereignty. There is not substantial difference 
from other nations in terms of building the infrastructural network at 
the physical layer, and all states, including Western democracies, place 
restrictions on the cyber realm. However, the way governments limit 
information at the content layer is the key battleground that 
differentiates China from other democratic states. While democratic 
countries usually see national security as being compromised by 
terrorism threats, the Chinese government casts a much wider net: 
including inappropriate and illegal content that threatens core socialist 
values as both cyber and national threats. 
 
As Lu Wei, the previous head of the Cyberspace Administration of 
China (CAC) and the former director of the Central Leading Group for 
Internet Security and Informatization stated, cyberspace is a double-
edged sword for China.259 Chinese policymakers consider cyberspace 
not only as an essential tool for economic growth, but also as a 
potential threat to domestic stability and national security. Achieving 
cyber sovereignty essentially requires striking the right balance 
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